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SIX OF ONE IS NOT A DOZEN OF THE OTHER. A
REEXAMINATION OF WILLIAMS v. FLORIDA
AND THE SIZE OF STATE CRIMINALJURIES
ROBERT H. MILLERt
The quality of social science scholarship displayed [in the Court's
decisions on jurV size] would not win a passing grade in a high school
psychology class."
I have experienced more shocks and surprises from the six-man
jury... than I experienced in all my previous 13 years
combined .... When I speak of shocks and surprises, I refer only to
those instances when every lawyer in the courtroom, including the
judge, was flabbergasted [by the verdict] 
.2
INTRODUCTION
In Williams v. Florida, the Supreme Court overturned nearly eight
hundred years of settled jurisprudence 4 when it held that the Sixth
Amendment guarantee to trial by jury5 did not require that the
constitutionally mandated jury be composed of twelve members.6
t B.A. 1993, Yale UniversityJ.D. Candidate 1998, University of Pennsylvania. This
Comment is dedicated to the great teachers who have touched and influenced my life:
Connie Scully, Millicent Hussey, and Selma Naccach-Hoff at Manchester Central;
Gene Clark III and Tom Giggi at Belknap; Dorothy Singer, Kelly Brownell, and Bob
Abelson at Yale; Frank Goodman, Bruce Mann, Kim Lane Scheppele, Pamela Harris,
and Seth Kreimer at the University of Pennsylvania Law School; S.D., for always
believing in me; and most of all, my parents, Robert and Monique Miller, whose many
sacrifices, love, and care have made everything possible.
' MichaelJ. Saks, Ignorance of Science Is No Excus4 TRIAL, Nov.-Dec. 1974, at 18, 18.
2 Judge VictorJ. Baum, The Six-Man Jury-The Cross Section Aborted, 12JUDGES'J. 12,
12 (1973).
" 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
See Williams, 399 U.S. at 122 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment) ("The
Court... strip[s] off the livery of history from thejury trial....").
' The Sixth Amendment reads, in pertinent part, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
6 See Williams, 399 U.S. at 102 ("[T]he fact that the jury at common law was
composed of precisely 12 is a historical accident, unnecessary to effect the purposes of
the jury system...."). In Williams, the Court decided that a defendant's Sixth
(621)
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Despite the Court's highly questionable conclusions about the
legislative history of the twelve-person jury requirement underlying
the Sixth Amendment, and the Court's "remarkable incompetence"
7
in interpreting and applying social-science findings to support its
departure from the twelve-person jury standard, Williams and its
progeny have never been reexamined. As a result, this line of cases
continues to support the premise that six- and twelve-person juries are
functionally equivalent, when in truth, modern social-science
research finds exactly the opposite.
This Comment revisits the Court's initial decision in Williams,
aided by a quarter-century of additional research and information, to
illustrate that the case was wrongly decided. First, this Comment will
demonstrate that historians reliably have traced the logical
development of the twelve-person jury back to the Middle Ages in
England, showing it to be anything but a "historical accident."' It will
also illustrate how Revolutionary-era legislative history strongly
indicates the Framers' intent to retain the twelve-person jury standard
in criminal trials.
More significantly, this Comment will reveal and discuss the
critical ways in which the Court's misinterpretation and
misapplication of social-science research in Williams and its progeny
triggered the "unthinkable"9  dismantling of an irrevocable
constitutional cornerstone. A comprehensive review of the modern
psychological literature will demonstrate that the functional
differences between six- and twelve-person juries: (1) implicate the
Williams Court's statements about the jury's essential functions, and
(2) may affect the outcome of many criminal trials. Finally, this
Comment will argue that as a result of these critical functional
differences, Williams and its progeny should be overruled, and the
size of all state and federal criminal juries restandardized to twelve
members in all non-petty criminal cases.
The system of trial by jury is again at the forefront of America's
collective consciousness; a subcommittee of the Judicial Conference
of the United States ° is considering a change to the Federal Rules of
Amendment rights, as made applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment,
see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-58 (1968), are not violated when a state
provides a six-person jury instead of a twelve-person jury.
Saks, supra note 1, at 19.
8 Willams, 399 U.S. at 102.
" Id. at 122 (Harlan,J., concurring in judgment).
'0 The Judicial Conference, a 27judge panel headed by the Chief Justice of the
United States, proposes rule changes directly to the Supreme Court. If approved by
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Civil Procedure that would require the impaneling of twelve-person
juries in all civil cases tried in federal courts." The Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure already require twelve-person juries, 2 but jury-
size requirements in state courts, which hear the vast majority of
criminal cases, remain widely disparate. 3  Additionally, the recent
trials of Rodney King and O.J. Simpson thrust discussions about juries
and jury functions back into the spotlight and provoked many
questions about the representative nature of juries, the quality of
deliberations, the influence of minority jurors, and the general
integrity of the jury process. With such considerations in mind, it is
both timely and appropriate to reexamine the Court's controversial
treatment ofjury size in Williams and its progeny.
I. A REVIEW OF SUPREME COURT RULINGS ONJURY SIZE
In Duncan v. Louisiana,4 the defendant was convicted of simple
battery after he was denied a jury trial pursuant to a provision in the
Louisiana Constitution that limited jury trials in criminal actions to
cases in which capital punishment or imprisonment at hard labor
might be imposed. 5  Duncan, who was sentenced to sixty days
imprisonment, alleged on appeal that his case was governed by the
Sixth Amendment's guarantee to trial by jury'6 as incorporated by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
7
In considering Duncan's incorporation argument, the Court
considered whether the right to trial by jury was among the
the Court, such rules automatically take effect unless blocked by Congress. See 28
U.S.C. § 2072-2074 (1994).
11 The Judicial Conference rejected the proposal by voice vote at its September
1996 meeting, but ordered a subcommittee to further study the issue. See U.S. Judicial
Group Rejects Twelve-MemberJuy Proposal REUTERS N. AM. WIRE, Sept. 17, 1996, available
in 1996 WL 11798812.
2 SeeFED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b).
s See infra Part III. This Comment presents an updated survey of the status of state
criminal-jury sizes in the United States.
'4 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
See LA. CONST. of 1921, art. VII, § 41.
16 For the relevant text of the Sixth Amendment, see supra note 5.
17 The Fourteenth Amendment reads, in pertinent part:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law ....
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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"fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of
all our civil and political institutions."" Ruling that trial by jury in
criminal cases was a fundamental principle of American
jurisprudence, the Court held that "the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees a right ofjury trial in all criminal cases which-were they
to be tried in a federal court-would come within the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee."' 9 Holding that Duncan's misdemeanor
was such a case, the Court ruled that the state court's decision to deny
Duncan's demand for ajury trial violated the Constitution."
In explaining its decision, the Court enunciated the first of the
two stated purposes of the modem-day criminal jury:
A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent
oppression by the Government.... Providing an accused with the right
to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard
against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the
compliant, biased, or eccentric judge. If the defendant preferred the
common-sense judgment of a jury ... he was to have it .... The deep
commitment of the Nation to the right of jury trial in serious criminal
cases... qualifies for protection under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and must therefore be respected by the
States.
2 1
Although the Duncan Court did not explicitly define "serious criminal
cases" and declined to draw a bright-line distinction between petty
offenses and serious crimes,u the Court held that because simple
18 Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926), quoted inDuncan, 391 U.S. at 148.
19 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149.
See id. at 150. The second frequently cited "purpose of thejury" is enunciated by
Justice White's majority opinion in Williams. See infra note 36 and text accompanying
notes 35-36.
21 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155-56.
2Although the Court cited the definition of "petty offense" used in the federal
courts ("those punishable by no more than six months in prison and a $500 fine"),
and the common practice of the Framers in late-eighteenth-century America, where
nonjury trials were almost always restricted to crimes punishable by a prison term of
six months or less, the Court refused to pinpoint a six-month prison term as the upper
limit of a petty offense. See id. at 161-62.
The Court, however, cited a number of cases establishing the differences between
petty and nonpetty offenses. Among these were Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373,
379-80 (1966) (holding that crimes carrying jail terms of less than six months in
duration do not require a jury trial if they meet the other qualifications for petty
offenses), and District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 625 (1937) (establishing the
penalty established for a general crime, as opposed to the penalty actually imposed for
the specific occurrence, as the significant factor in determining an act's status as a
"serious crime," and potentially determining when the Sixth Amendment mandate to
trial byjury is applicable).
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battery was punishable in Louisiana by as much as a two-year prison
term, it was a nonpetty offense requiring ajury trial.2
When Duncan incorporated the right of trial by jury in criminal
cases into the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court implicitly assumed
that these state criminal juries, like their federal counterparts, would
have twelve-member panels.2' Two years later, however, the Court in
Williams would decide differently.
In Williams, the petitioner was charged with robbery and moved
for trial before a twelve-person jury instead of the six-person jury
permitted by a Florida statute in all noncapital criminal cases.2 The
trial court denied Williams's motion. He was tried before a jury of
six, convicted, and sentenced to life imprisonment. Williams
challenged the conviction on Sixth Amendment grounds, claiming
that his constitutional right to trial by jury entitled him to a twelve-
person jury instead of the six-member panel provided by Florida law. 6
By a five-to-three majority,27 the Court in Williams held that
although earlier cases assumed that the Sixth Amendment right to
trial by jury required ajury of twelve,28 "the 12-man panel is... not a
The Court subsequently determined that an offense is "non-petty," even if the
maximum authorized prison sentence is six months or less, if additional statutory
penalties are "so severe that they clearly reflect a legislative determination that the
offense in question is a 'serious' one." Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538,
543 (1989).
23 SeeDuncan, 391 U.S. at 161-62.
2' See 1 THE CONSTrTUTIoNAL LAW DICTIONARY 256 (Ralph C. Chandler et al. eds.,
1985) [hereinafter DICrIONARY] ("Duncan v. Louisiana... presumed state juries would
have 12jurors .... ").
See Williams, 399 U.S. 79, 79-80 (1970). The statute read, in pertinent part:
"'Twelve men shall constitute ajury to try all capital cases, and six men shall constitute
ajury to try all other criminal cases.'" Id. at 80 n.3 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 913.10
(1) (West 1967)).
2 See id. at 79-80, 86.
Justice Blackmun did not take part in the decision.
28 See Williams, 399 U.S. at 90-92 & nn.26-31. The Court discussed the following
cases: Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930) (stating that the Sixth
Amendment jury was characterized by three essential features: "(1) that the jury
should consist of twelve men, neither more nor less; (2) that the trial should be in the
presence and under the superintendence of a judge.., and (3) that the verdict
should be unanimous"); Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 517 (1905) (stating
that the jury to which the Sixth Amendment referred was intended to be ajury of 12);
Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 586 (1900) (concluding that there was "no doubt" that
the Sixth Amendment was intended to require a jury of 12 members); Thompson v.
Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349 (1898) (noting that the jury to which the Sixth Amendment
referred was intended to be a jury "constituted, as it was at common law, of twelve
persons, neither more nor less").
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necessary ingredient of 'trial by jury."' ' The Court found that
Williams's trial before a six-person jury was constitutional. Writing for
the majority, Justice White proffered two justifications for the Court's
conclusion.
First, although Justice White conceded that "[i] t may well be that
the usual expectation [of the Framers] was that the jury would consist
of 12,"30 he noted that there was no historical evidence suggesting that
the Framers intended the twelve-person jury to be an "indispensable
component of the Sixth Amendment."31  As such, Justice White
concluded that " [n] othing in this history suggests, then, that we do
violence to the letter of the Constitution by turning to other than
purely historical considerations to determine which features of the
jury system, as it existed at common law, were preserved in the
Constitution.
With the "yoke of history"33 thus removed, Justice White noted
that the real inquiry should examine the functions of the twelve-
person jury in light of the primary purposes of the jury trial.3
Discussing the purpose of the modern-day jury, 5 Justice White
determined that:
[T]he essential feature of a jury obviously lies in the interposition
between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment of
a group of laymen, and in the community participation and shared
responsibility that results from that group's determination of guilt or
innocence. The performance of this role is not a function of the
particular number of the body that makes up the jury. To be sure, the
number should probably be large enough to promote group
deliberation, free from outside attempts at intimidation, and to provide
a fair possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section of the
. 36
communty.
Concluding that (1) a six-person jury would not suffer increased
susceptibility to intimidation and would be as effective at deliberation,
(2) the differences between six- and twelve-person juries in providing
a fair cross-section of the community would be negligible, and (3) the
Williams, 399 U.S. at 86.
30 Id. at 98.
3' Id. at 100.
32 Id. at 99.
Id at 122-23 (Harlan,J., concurring injudgment).
See id. at 99-100.
For the Court's first stated purpose of the modern-day jury, see supra text
accompanying note 21.
36 Williams, 399 U.S. at 100.
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jury's reliability as a factfinder would not decrease with its reduction
in size, Justice White dismantled what previously was construed as one
of the most secure and axiomatic protections of American law."
Concurring in the result in Williams, Justice Harlan accused the
majority of diluting "the settled meaning of the federal right to a trial
byjury."38 Although Justice Harlan sided with the majority in holding
that the "right" to a twelve-person jury did not extend to state
criminal trials, he claimed this was because Duncan was wrongly
decided. 9 Justice Harlan adamantly believed that the Sixth Amend-
ment guaranteed a right to a trial by ajury of twelve;" he just did not
believe that the Sixth Amendment applied to the states through
41incorporation.
In the years following the Court's dismantling of the twelve-
person jury requirement, state legislatures tested the constitutional
validity of other Sixth and Seventh Amendment rights to trial by
42jury.4  After Williams and Apodaca v. Oregon stripped the Sixth
' See id. at 100-02 (discussing three principal effects of a six-person jury); see also
DICrIONARY, supra note 24, at 255-56 (discussing the significance of Williams and jury
size and noting Justice White's discussion of three principal effects of a six-person
jury).
Williams, 399 U.S. at 138 (Harlan,J., concurring injudgment).
See id. at 118 (Harlan,J., concurring in judgment).
40 Justice Harlan strongly criticized the majority's conclusion that the twelve-
person jury was a "historical accident," noting that this accident "has recurred without
interruption since the 14th century," id. at 125, and protesting that the Court
"stripp[ed] off the livery of history from the jury trial," id. at 122. Justice Harlan also
criticized the majority for ignoring the weight of stare decisis, stating that "[t]he
circumvention of history is compounded by the cavalier disregard of numerous
pronouncements of this Court that reflect the understanding of the jury as one of 12
members." Id. at 126. For discussion of prior Supreme Court cases iterating the Sixth
Amendment's contemplation of a twelve-person jury, see supra note 28 and
accompanying text.
"' See Williams, 399 U.S. at 117-18 (Harlan,J., concurring in judgment) (stating that
the incorporation doctrine did not fit well with our federal structure and thatDuncan
was wrongly decided).
42 Some of the Williams-progeny cases addressed the question ofjury unanimity, a
subject largely beyond the scope of this Comment. The Court first addressed the
question of whetherjury unanimity was implicit in the text of the Sixth Amendment in
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
In Apodaca, the petitioners challenged the validity of their nonunanimous
convictions on various felony charges, arguing that the Sixth Amendment did not
contemplate nonunanimous juries. See id. at 406. The Court, in a plurality opinion
written by Justice White, ruled that unanimity, another element historically regarded
to be required by the Sixth Amendment, was not constitutionally mandated. See id. at
411 (plurality opinion) ("[W]e perceive no difference between juries required to act
unanimously and those permitted to convict or acquit by votes of 10 to two or 11 to
one."). Justice Powell, concurring in a companion case, found that Duncan was
1998]
628 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREV!EW
Amendment of its size and unanimity requirements in state criminal
cases, there remained no principled stopping points for the Court to
prevent the further erosion of the size of the state criminal jury.
43
One year after Apodaca, in Colgrove v. Battin, the Court extended
the principle announced in Williams to civil juries." In Colgrove, the
Court held that the Seventh Amendment's trial-by-jury guarantee was
satisfied by a six-person jury. 5 In reaching this decision, the Colgrove
Court hearkened back to the Williams decision in restating that the
reliability of the jury as factfinder was not a function of its size. The
Court thus decided that departing from the previous twelve-member
standard in federal civil cases would not do violence to any
wrongly decided, and adopted Justice Harlan's partial-incorporation position, ruling
that although the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury presupposed a unanimous
verdict in federal trials, states could deviate from the unanimity requirement because
all Sixth Amendment guarantees were not extended to the states through due process
requirements. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 369 (1972) (Powell, J.,
concurring) ("I do not think that all of the elements of jury trial within the meaning
of the Sixth Amendment are necessarily embodied in or incorporated into the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."). For further discussion, see
DICrIoNARY, supra note 24, at 257-58, and GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
430-31 (12th ed. 1991).
The Apodaca plurality followed the reasoning of the Williams majority in deciding
that, like that of the twelve-person jury, the history of the unanimity requirement was
.not of constitutional stature" when considered in the light of the function it was
intended to perform. Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 406 (plurality opinion). Citing the
language in Duncan that established the function of the jury in modem society, see
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968), the Apodaca plurality found that a
constitutional requirement of unanimity in criminaljury verdicts would "not materially
contribute" to the jury's designated function of "interpos[ing] between the accused
and his accuser... the commonsensejudgment of a group of laymen." Apodaca, 406
U.S. at 410 (plurality opinion) (citing William, 399 U.S. at 100).
The immediate problem raised by the plurality decision in Apodaca was just how
nonunanimous a nonunanimous verdict in a criminal trial could get before it began to
encroach on the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard required for criminal
conviction. Anticipating this issue, Justice Blackmun, in his concurrence in Johnson,
explicitly noted that his decision did not imply that he regarded "a State's split-verdict
system as a wise one." Johnson, 406 U.S. at 366 (Blackmun,J., concurring).
Nevertheless, Apodaca established the constitutional sufficiency of nine-to-three
convictions in state criminal trials. The sufficiency of closer margins and nonunani-
mous decisions ofjuries smaller than 12 but larger than six remains an open question.
See DICTIONARY, supra note 24, at 258 ("Apodaca and Williams opened doors relative to
jury decision and size long thought... locked shut.").
41 See, e.g., Elizabeth Decker Tanke & Tony J. Tanke, Getting off a Slippery Slope:
Social Science in the Judicial Process, 34 AM. PSYCHOL. 1130, 1131 (1979) ("[T]he Court
would be confronted with successively smaller 'juries' until it was forced to declare a
minimum size or to permit jury trial to pass into oblivion .... The Court's own
[functional] test left it with no reasonable avenue of escape.").
" Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
4' See id. at 159-60.
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"substantive aspect of the right of trial by jury."46
The Colgrove Court also cited four studies as "convincing empirical
evidence of the correctness of the Williams conclusion that there is
'no discernible difference between the results reached by the two
different-sized juries.'" 47  As a result, the Court concluded that
"nothing... persuades us to depart from the conclusion reached in
Williams .... [W]hile we express no view as to whether any number
less than six would suffice, we conclude that a jury of six satisfies the
Seventh Amendment's guarantee of trial by jury in civil cases."48
Many states have since accepted the Court's invitation to depart
from their twelve-person jury standards and unanimity requirements
in civil and criminal cases.4 9 This widespread departure from such
requirements lends special weight to Justice Marshall's warnings in
his Colgrove dissent that the Court had, through its decisions in
Williams, Apodaca, and Colgrove, eradicated any principled way to "'get
off the "slippery slope" before . . . reach [ing] the bottom."' 50
The Court faced this reality with zealous unanimity in Ballew v.
Georgia, a case where a criminal defendant had been tried and
convicted by a five-person jury pursuant to Georgia law.5 In Ballew,
the Court ruled that "the purpose and functioning of the jury in a
criminal trial is seriously impaired ... by a reduction in size to below
six members" 2 and "creat[es] a substantial threat to Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees."53 The Georgia Court of Ap-
peals had cited Williams previously in rejecting Ballew's argument that
his trial before a five-person panel violated his Sixth Amendment
right to trial byjury.5
46 Id. at 157.
4 Id. at 158 (quoting Williams, 399 U.S. at 101). For a complete analysis of how
proper interpretation of this "convincing empirical evidence" would have led the
Court to a different conclusion, see infra Part IV.
48 Colgrove 413 U.S. at 159-60 (footnote omitted).
' See DICrIoNARY, supra note 24, at 258 ("Many states have accepted the Court's
invitation to alter their policies [regarding jury decision and size] accordingly."); see
also infra Part III (outlining the current status of state criminaljury requirements).
0 Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 181 n.9 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Wiliams, 399 U.S.
at 91 n.28).
5' 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
512 Id. at 239.
'- Id. at 243.
14 See id. at 228 (discussing the decision of the Georgia Court of Appeals). Absent
a holding by the Supreme Court that a five-person jury was constitutionally
inadequate, the Georgia Court of Appeals considered itself bound by state-court
precedent which, for reasons of administrative convenience andjudicial economy, had
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The unanimous Ballew Court, including all five members of the
Williams majority who, eight years earlier, had voted to allow states to
depart from the twelve-person jury standard, was forced to draw an
arbitrary line.5 Seeking a logical underpinning for its decision, the
Court examined the growing body of social-science research
comparing six- and twelve-person juries undertaken in response to
the Williams decision. The Court, however, misapplied the findings of
this research to support its desired conclusion that effective
functioning of a criminal jury is constitutionally impaired when it falls
below six members.
Guided by misapplied research findings, the Ballew Court set the
minimum boundary marker for the state criminal jury at six
members. As Part IV of this Comment will demonstrate, however, a
proper interpretation of the studies upon which the Ballew majority
relied could have produced only one result: the reversal of Williams
and the reinstatement of the twelve-person jury requirement
57
allowed the practice. The Georgia prosecutor in Ballew seized upon language in
Williams that stated, "'We have no occasion in this case to determine what minimum
number can still constitute a "jury," but we do not doubt that six is above that
minimum'" and argued that "'[i]f six is above that minimum, five cannot be below the
minimum [because] [t]here is no number in between.'" Id. at 230-31 n.9 (plurality
opinion) (quoting Brief for Respondent at 4).
5 See id. at 239 (plurality opinion) ('We readily admit that we do not pretend to
discern a clear line .... ").
56 See id. (plurality opinion) ("Because of the fundamental importance of the jury
trial to the American system of criminal justice, any further reduction that promotes
inaccurate and possibly biased decisionmaking, that causes untoward differences in
verdicts, and that prevents juries from truly representing their communities, attains
constitutional significance."). For a complete discussion of the Court's misapplication
of this research, see infra Part IV.D.
57 Part IV will show how the Court in Ballew finally interpreted the body of social-
science research correctly, only to misapply its conclusions. See discussion infra Part
IV. Nearly all the studies cited by the Ballew Court examined the.differences between
six- and twelve-person juries and concluded that twelve-person juries were significantly
preferable to juries composed of six. The Ballew Court, however, manipulated these
findings to support their necessary, but entirely different, conclusion that a five-person
jury unconstitutionally impaired jury function, while the six-person jury approved in
Williams did not.
With the minimum state criminal jury size set at six by Ballew, and the
constitutionality of nonunanimous verdicts confirmed by Apodaca, it took less than a
year for the Court to grant certiorari in the final case in the Williams line, Burch v.
Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979). Predictably, Burch involved provisions of a state
constitution and a state code of criminal procedure that allowed misdemeanor
convictions by nonunanimous juries of six. See LA. CONST. of 1921 art. VII, § 41 ("A
case in which the punishment may be confinement at hard labor or confinement
without hard labor for more than six months shall be tried before ajury of six persons,
five of whom must concur to render a verdict."); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
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Although the twelve-person jury and the unanimous verdict
requirements in criminal trials have been retained in federal courts ss
Williams and its progeny have seriously eroded state criminal juries,
which hear the great majority of criminal cases. At the state level, the
former presumption of a unanimous verdict by a twelve-person jury
has given way to a constitutional right to a criminal trial before
something between a six-person unanimous jury and a twelve-person
jury permitted to reach a nine-to-three verdict. The constitutionality
of closer margins in twelve-person jury trials, and of possible
intermediate jury size and unanimity combinations, remains
unresolved. 9
Williams and its progeny have left state criminaljury requirements
in utter disarray, and, in many cases, of questionable constitutionality.
More importantly, defendants' due process and liberty interests are
presently safeguarded by juries that do not function according to the
Framers' intent as interpreted in Duncan and Williams.6° Just how
severely these eroded criminal juries are malfunctioning, and how
greatly this malfunction jeopardizes the integrity of the criminal-jury
process, will be addressed in Part IV of this Comment.
779(A) (West Supp. 1979) ("A defendant charged with a misdemeanor... shall be
tried by ajury of sixjurors, five of whom must concur to render a verdict.").
The Burch Court disagreed with the Louisiana Supreme Court's conclusion that
conviction by a five-sixths majority of a six-person jury did not offend a defendant's
Sixth Amendment rights. See Burch, 441 U.S. at 133 (citing State v. Wrestle, Inc., 360
So. 2d 831, 838 (La. 1978)). The Court ruled that"conviction by a nonunanimous six-
member jury in a state criminal trial for a nonpetty offense deprives an accused of his
constitutional right to trial byjury." Id. at 134. Recognizing Burch as the culmination
of its decisions on jury size and unanimity, the Court concluded:
[W]e do not pretend the ability to discern a priori a bright line below which
the number of jurors participating in the trial or in the verdict would not
permit the jury to function in the manner required by our prior cases. But
having already departed from the strictly historical requirements ofjury trial,
it is inevitable that lines must be drawn somewhere if the substance of the jury
trial right is to be preserved.
Id. at 137 (citations omitted). As a result, the Burch Court unanimously ruled that if a
state had reduced the size of its criminal jury to the constitutional minimum of six,
only a unanimous verdict could pass constitutional muster. See id. at 139.
"SeeFED. R. CRiM. P. 23(b). See infra note 144 for the text of the rule.
59 See DICTIONARY, supra note 24, at 258 (noting that Apodaca and Williams
reopened the possibility of intermediate size and unanimity values).
60 See supra notes 28-31, 40 and accompanying text (discussing the Justices'
competing interpretations of how the Framers envisioned the jury).
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II. THE ORIGINS OF THE TWELVE-PERSONJURY
A. Leading Theories
The precise wellspring of the twelve-person jury is somewhat
uncertain. Although the issue has been studied and debated for
more than a century, there is still no agreement about it.61 Scholars
61
have traced the origins to sources as diverse as ancient Greece, the
Roman Conquest,6 the Biblical importance of the number twelve,
64
ancient reliance on court astrologers,6 the Anglo-Saxon era in
England,6 the Norman Conquest, 67 the Assize of Clarendon,6 and the
Magna Carta. 9 Some explanations are more convincing than others,
but if one heeds the words of Sir Edmund Burke-that modem juries
have not "jumped, like Minerva, out of the head of Jove in complete
armor,'"7--one finds more than sufficient evidence to conclude that
the evolution of the modem jury as a body of twelve-persons was far
61 See WILLIAM FoRsYrH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BYJURY 2 (2d ed., Lenox Hill Publ'g &
Distrib. Co. 1971) (1878) ("Few subjects have exercised the ingenuity and baffled the
research of the historian more than the origin of the jury."); Larry T. Bates, Trial by
Jury After Williams v. Florida, 10 HAMLINE L. REV. 53, 53 (1987) ("The origin of the
Anglo-Americanjury is a much disputed question.").
" See LLOYD E. MOORE, THEJURY 1 (2d ed. 1988) (describing the trial of Orestes
on the charge of matricide); see also infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
63 See MOORE, supra note 62, at 3 (discussing the way in which the Romans brought
their form of thejury to England); see also infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
64 See PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BYJURY 8 (1956) (listing religious explanations for a
jury of twelve); see also infra note 81 (citing authorities that trace the number 12 to
Scripture).
SeeJohn A. Matthews, TheJury-Old Wine in New Bottles, 39 FLA. B.J. 94, 94-97
(1965) (looking for modern substance in the idea that one juror was chosen for each
of the 12 signs of the Zodiac).
See 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 38-39 (2d ed. 1899) (tracing the
origins of the jury to Anglo-Saxon oath-swearers).
67 See CHARLES HOMER HASKINS, NORMAN INSTITUTIONS 196-238 (1918) (tracing
the roots of the English jury from the Norman Conquest); see also infra notes 76-80 and
accompanying text.
See THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 97-
110 (1929) (discussing the regular procedures established by the Assize of
Clarendon); see also infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349 (1898) (stating that the jury
contemplated by the Magna Carta was a jury of 12); see also infra notes 92-107 and
accompanying text.
70 MOORE, supra note 62, at 14 (quoting 6 THE WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF




1. The Greeks and Romans,
and the Influence of the Gods and Religion
According to ancient mythology, the first trial ever held on the
Areopagus 7t was the trial of Ares, god of War, for the murder of
Halirrhothius, the son of Poseidon, god of the Sea. That earliest of
recorded jury cases was tried before a panel of twelve gods. The
panel deadlocked at six to six, resulting in Ares's acquittal.72 The
earliest known jury trial of a "mortal" also involved a jury of twelve.
This trial was the subject of Aeschylus's play, The Eumenides, first
presented in 458 B.C.7s Most scholars concede, however, that any
direct line of influence between the Greek and Roman legal systems
and the development of the English jury was "'lost in the night of
time.'" 74 Nevertheless, the residual-influence theory has not been
dispelled, and many scholars believe that the recorded history of the
Greeks and Romans played an influential role in the development of
the English jury.75
2. The Jury During the Norman Invasion of England
Many scholars have traced the origins of the English jury to the
bifurcated nature of Charlemagne's Frankish inquisito, brought to the
7' The Areopagus was the hill where the supreme tribunal of Athens convened.
72 See THE NEW CENTURY CLASSIcAL HANDBOOK 142 (Catherine B. Avery ed., 1962)
(noting that Ares was acquitted because "he was protecting his daughter's honor").
73 See AESCHYLUS, ORESTEIA: AGAMEMNON, ThELIBATION BEARERS, THE EUMENIDES
135, 161 (David Grene & Richmond Lattimore eds., Richmond Lattimore trans., Univ.
of Chicago Press 1953) (n.d.) (explaining how Pallas Athena, patron goddess of the
Trojans, broke the six-to-six tie in the jury of 12 Athenian citizens in Orestes's trial for
the murder of his mother, Clytemnestra, who had earlier murdered his father
Agamemnon); see also MOORE, supra note 62, at 1 (recounting the trial of Orestes).
74 Richard S. Arnold, Trial by Jury: The Constitutional Right to aJuy of Twelve in Civil
Trials, 22 HOFSTRAL. REv. 1, 6 n.19 (1993) (quoting FORSYM, supra note61, at 2).
75 SeeJEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 108 (19,49) (stating that the "germ" of the
modern jury may have its roots in fifth-century Roman practice); MAXIMUS A. LESSER,
THE HISTORIcAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE JURY SYSTEM 171 (New York, Lawyer's
Cooperative 1894) (stating that "an institution resembling the modern jury in various
respects must have existed in England-brought thither by the Romans, and
originating among the Greeks-at the earliest civilized period"); MOORE, supra note
62, at 4 (suggesting that the idea of the jury was passed down through time from the
Egyptians to the Greeks to the Romans); POLLOCK& MAITLAND, supra note 66, at 141-
42 (suggesting that the Frankish inquisito, more definitively accepted as an ancestor of
the English jury, was influenced by the Roman system).
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English mainland by the Franks during the Battle of Hastings in
1066. 6  The inquisito had an accusatory component-perhaps the
precursor of the modem grand jury-followed by a determination of
proof by interrogation, suggestive of the modem petit jury.7
Although this theory fails to account for the already developing
system ofjuries in England during the Anglo-Saxon period preceding
William's invasion," scholars note that the Frankish system had
"considerable influence on the courts of William the Conqueror" in
the centuries following the invasion." According to these scholars, no
system of laws in eleventh-century England remotely compared to that
which William brought across the Channel to England in 1066.80
Many of the earliest definitive references to a jury of twelve are
linked to church-related matters, where the Biblical significance of
76 See HEINRICH BRUNNER, DIE ENTSTEHUNG DER SCHWURGERICHTE [THE ORIGIN
OF JURIES] 92, 118 (Berlin, Weidmannsche Buchhandlung 1872) (demonstrating
through a comparison of language contained in documents from the Frankish and
Anglo-Norman eras that the Frankish inquisito and the English jury probably had a
common origin); WILLIAM HOLDsWoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 312 (7th ed.
1956) (stating that the inquisito is "the root from which the English jury springs");
POLLOCK& MAITLAND, supra note 66, at 141-42 (calling the jury the "palladium of our
liberties" and ascribing its origin to the Frankish rather than the English); Arnold,
supra note 74, at 6-7 ("The best guess now [about the origin of the jury] seems to be
that William the Conqueror brought the jury across the Channel to England with the
Frankish inquisito in 1066, and that the English jury finally took root at that time,
eventually developing into its modern form toward the end of the fourteenth
century.").
See MOORE, supra note 62, at 14 (discussing the inquisito). The "petitjury" is the
jury for the trial of a civil or criminal action. It was given this name to distinguish it
from the grandjury. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 856 (6th ed. 1990).
78 See MOORE, supra note 62, at 24-25 (discussing various statutes providing for
juries which were in force in England during the period before William's invasion).
Moore illustrates that a twelve-person jury might have been developing in Anglo-Saxon
England prior to, and exclusive of, the Norman system, discussing several statutes of
the Saxon Kings, including statutes of King Aethelred I (865-871) ("Twelve laymen
shall administer the law. . . ."); King Alfred the Great (871-899) ("If a royal thane be
accused of homicide he shall purge himself with twelve royal thanes. Any other man
shall purge himself with eleven of his own rank and one royal thane."); King Eadgar
the Peaceful (959-975) ("[T]welve witnesses ... should be appointed to swear to make
true depositions."); and King Aethelred II, the Unready (978-1016) (declaring that"a
moot would be held in every wapentake," whereby the 12 oldest thegns take an oath to
servejustice). Id. at 25-26.
79 Id. at 17.
80 See id. at 18, 33-34, 34 ("Norman law.., made a deep impression on English
society."); Arnold, supra note 74, at 6 ("William the Conqueror brought the jury across
the Channel to England .... ").
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the number twelve was clearly an influence.8 ' An inquest ordered to
determine the proper extent of the lands held by the Church at Ely,
alternatively dated between 1088 and 1086, is thought to be the first
historically verifiable use of such ajury in an English court.82
Henry II, who reigned in England from 1154 to 1189, introduced
the most expansive legal changes in English history.83 One of Henry
II's most significant contributions was the Constitution of Clarendon,
enacted in 1164 to address problems of class intimidation. This
Constitution provided that "[t]he sheriff shall cause 12 legal men of
the neighborhood... to take an oath in the presence of the bishop
that they will declare the truth. 84  These sworn juries were also
expected to render verdicts of guilt or innocence, eclipsing the
former tasks of accusatory courts, and providing the first real
operational similarity to the modern jury.8
The creation of the Grand Assize of Clarendon, a court designed
by Henry II, however, is widely recognized as the most significant
86event in the initial establishment of the English jury. The Assize
"' See, e.g., 1 EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF
ENGLAND 155 (photo. reprint 1979) (1628) ("And that number of twelve is much
respected in holy Writ, as 12 apostles, 12 stones, 12 tribes, etc."); DEVLIN, supra note
64, at 8 (noting the importance given to the number 12 in selecting political and
judicial bodies and suggesting that the number 12 had Biblical significance); JOHN
PROFFATr, TRIAL BY JURY 112 n.4 (San Francisco, Sumner Whitney & Co. 1877)
("[T]his number is no less esteemed by our own law than by holy writ. If the twelve
apostles on their twelve thrones must try us in our eternal state, good reason hath the
law to appoint the number twelve to try us in our temporal. The tribes of Israel were
twelve, the patriarchs were twelve, and Solomon's officers were twelve'); Arnold, supra
note 74, at 12 (noting that as far back as the year 725, Morgan of Gla-Morgan, an
ancient King of Wales, referred to trial by jury as Apostolic Law when he stated,
"For... as Christ and his twelve apostles were finally to judge the world, so human
tribunals should be composed of the king and twelve wise men").
812 See MOORE, supra note 62, at 33. This inquest stemmed from a dispute between
one of the King's sheriffs and the Bishop of Rochester, both of whom claimed the
same land. 'With the Bishop of Bayeaux presiding, the jurors, fearing the King,
decided in his favor. The Bishop instead ordered the jury to choose 12 from their
number to take an oath and confirm the verdict. See id. The fact that an English
bishop ordered ajury of 12 to be seated lends support to the theories suggesting a
Biblical origin for the twelve-person requirement.
See id. at 34 (noting that Henry II "introduc[ed] more far reaching legal changes
than any other Monarch that ever held that throne").
"a Id. at 35 (citation omitted).
See id. (discussing the provisions of the Constitution of Clarendon).
86 See id. ("Of all the legislation of Henry II, the Grand Assize ... proved to be the
most far reaching in terms of establishing the jury."). See generally JOHN BEAMES, A
TRANSLATION OF GLANVILLE (London, A.J. Valpy 1812) (describing the structure and
function of the Grand Assize).
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gave an individual whose tenant rights to property were challenged
an alternative to a duel-namely, to place himself before the Grand
Assize and have his dispute settled by an inquest of four knights and
twelve neighbors."7 If the claimant chose the Assize, a writ would issue
which requested the king to "[s] ummon... four lawful Knights of the
Vicinage... to elect on their oaths, twelve lawful Knights of that
Vicinage, who better know the truth, to return, on their oaths,
whether [the tenant] or [the claimant] ... have the greater right in
that land... ."" The king's knights appeared and chose twelve
jurors, who were summoned to court to render a verdict. The tenant
and the claimant had the right to attend the election of the jury and
to challenge the knights' selections for good cause. At the time of the
Assize of Clarendon, the requirement of twelve was firmly established,
because if fewer than twelve of the elected jurors had sufficient
knowledge of the facts, additional jurors were elected until a jury of
twelve was in place.89
There were various other "neighborhood inquests" during the
reign of Henry II, including those in the Assize of Northampton in
1176, the Assize of Darrein in 1181, and the Assize of the Forest in
1184.90 In all of the above, the jury was assembled according to the
issuance of a royal writ summoning "twelve free and lawful men."9'
3. The Jury at the Time of the Magna Carta
The Magna Carta, issued by King John at Runnymede on June 15,
1215, is regarded as "the foundation of English constitutional
liberty."92 The first constitutional right to a jury trial was among its
credits. 9 3 Most modem authorities do not place the granting of this
right in the seemingly obvious article 39,4 but rather in the more
87 See MooRE, supra note 62, at 36.
8 Id. at 36-37. "Vicinage" was a common-law geographical term similar to a
"district."
9 See id. at 37.
'0 See id. at 38.
91 Id.
2 BLACK'sLAwDICIONARY951-52 (6th ed. 1990).
9s See MooRE, supra note 62, at 47 ("[The Magna Carta] has commonly been
credited with guaranteeing trial by jury."); Arnold, supra note 74, at 13 ("[T]he
constitutional right to ajury trial was guaranteed by the Magna Carta....").
9 Article 39 of the Magna Carta reads: "No freeman shall be seized, or impris-
oned, or dispossessed, or outlawed, or banished, or any way destroyed; nor will we
condemn him, nor will we commit him to prison, excepting by the legal judgment of
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subtle language of article 36.95 Lloyd Moore has noted that article
39's reference to "peers" did not necessarily imply 'Jurors," but that
article 36's reference to "inquisition," read in its historical context,
can be interpreted as "jury."96 Implementation of trial by jury after
the Magna Carta was issued, however, was slow in coming, largely due
to opposition from the Church.97  The decision in 1215 by Pope
Innocent III forbidding members of the clergy from participating in
"ordeals" of fire and water, however, led to the proffering of a writ by
Henry III in 1219 that established trial by jury for defendants who
formerly would have been subject to such ordeals.9'
In 1166, the Assize of Clarendon required that certain felonies be
presented to ajury of twelve individuals chosen from the residents of
the county and filled by four knights from neighboring villages. In
1176, the Assize of Northampton added a second jury of twelve to the
indictment process. Thus, after the Assize of Northampton, felony
cases were routinely heard by two juries of twelve.9
After 1215, presentment juries, rather than ordeals, determined
guilt or innocence."° The use of presentment juries was formalized
his peers, or by the laws of the land." The Great Charter of KingJohn (Richard Thomson
trans.), reprinted in RAY STRINGHAM, MAGNA CARTA 234 (1966).
9- Article 36 of the Magna Carta reads: "Nothing shall be given or taken for the
future for the Writ of Inquisition of life or limb, but it shall be given without charge,
and not." Id.
The "writ of inquisition" has been read as a reference to the process of trial by
jury that developed out of the Frankish inquisito. Prior to the Magna Carta, such jury
trials were only available for purchase. As such, article 36 has been interpreted to be
the constitutional source for free trial by jury. Cf MOORE, supra note 62, at 48 ("A
reading of the Magna Carta indicates that article 36 is the one guaranteeing jury
trial.").
97 The Magna Carta's provision for trials by jury triggered suspicion because it
directly contravened the long-accepted principles of the Leges Henrici that the frailty of
human testimony was insufficient to condemn a man to the gallows. Therefore, duels
or "ordeals," such as prolonged submersion in water or encounters with fire, were
thought to be more accurate ways for the accused to prove his innocence. See Bates,
supra note 61, at 54-55 ("[Jury trials] went contrary to the accepted principle of law set
forth in the Leges Henrici that 'mere human testimony is not enough to send a man to
the gallows.'").
-' SeeMOORE, supra note 62, at 50 (noting that Pope Innocent III's decision "was to
eventually have great effect on the use of jury trial in criminal cases" (citation
omitted)); Bates, supra note 61, at 54 (noting that when "the Church prohibited clergy
participation in the ordeal, [it] in effect eliminated the ordeal as a method of proof").
Note again the significant interplay between the Crown and the Church in the
development of the jury system-another indication that religious influence may
ultimately underlie the twelve-person jury requirement.
99 SeeBates, supra note 61, at 62.
100 See id.
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in the late thirteenth century, such that "twenty-four persons from the
county were summoned and twenty-three of these were selected for
service, with a majority [i.e., twelve] needed to find a 'true bill' [i.e.,
indictment]." °1 If at least twelve of the twenty-three jurors returned a
true bill, the justice questioned the majority to determine their
knowledge about the case and swore the twelve with the most reliable
"means of knowledge" to return a verdict of guilt or innocence after
deliberation. 0 2 As a result, twelve members-a simple majority of the
original indictment panel of twenty-three-were selected to
deliberate the case and return a verdict.
Larry Bates and Theodore Plucknett have noted the logic of this
process, since the purpose of these jury trials was "'to get information
useful to the Crown from those people most likely to have it.''"0 3 The
theory was that, among the twenty-four jurors who accused a
defendant (from whom twenty-three were chosen), there were
enough individuals possessing sufficient knowledge of the
defendant's reputation to decide her guilt or innocence. After the
indictment of an accused by the panel of twenty-three presentment
jurors, no further information could be gained from those jurors
having no additional knowledge of the defendant's reputation, so
these individuals were eliminated.0 4  Accordingly, after the
indictment, the jury panel was reduced to the twelve individuals with
the best additional knowledge of the defendant's reputation.
The law mandated that a majority of the initial panel of twenty-
three presentment jurors both indict and convict. Thus, at least
twelve of the twenty-three initial jurors were needed to indict, and a
unanimous verdict of the twelve remaining impaneled jurors was
needed to convict. Since even a single dissenting vote meant that the
final verdict was not rendered by a majority (twelve) of the original
presentment jury of twenty-three, the unanimity requirement of the
modern twelve-person juries also finds a historical anchor in this
105
process.
As scholars have noted, the general infrastructure of the criminal
jury as a twelve-member body rendering unanimous verdicts was
10 Id. (citation omitted).
102 See id.
1'3 Id. (quoting PLUCKNETr, supra note 68, at 109).




clearly established by the time of Edward III in 1377.' 6  This
infrastructure remained largely unchanged for the next six hundred
years, until the Williams Court declared the entire nine-hundred-year
evolutionary process of the twelve-person jury a "historical
accident."'""
B. The Framers'Intent for the American CriminalJury
Not surprisingly, the conceptualization of the jury that surfaced in
the American colonies bore a striking resemblance to the petit jury
described by English treatises, upon which the Framers heavily
relied.'8 Recognizing this, the Supreme Court in Ex Parte Grossman
suggested that the "language of the Constitution cannot be
interpreted safely except by reference to the common law and to
British institutions as they were when the instrument was framed and
adopted."'O' As Bates suggested, had the Williams Court followed
these interpretive guidelines, they would have found the necessary
evidence to leave the centuries-old tradition of the twelve-person
unanimous criminal jury undisturbed."0 Instead, the Court placed
considerable interpretive emphasis on the legislative history of the
article III "trial by jury" clause."' The majority noted that "[t]he 'very
scanty history [of this provision] in the records of the Constitutional
'*6 See, e.g., FORSYfH, supra note 61, at 207 (noting that the criminal jury trial was
"nearly if not quite the same as at the present day"); Bates, supra note 61, at 61 (noting
that by the fourteenth century in England, the structure of the criminal jury had
become consistent and its use had become common).
107 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 102 (1970).
"s See Bates, supra note 61, at 64 (noting that English treatises were "major legal
resources within the [c]olonies"); see also 3 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF
THE LAW 727 (London, A. Strahan 1807) (stating that the petit jury consisted of
"twelve and can be neither more nor less"); 2 HENRY OF BRAcrON, ON THE LAWS AND
CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 328-29 (George E. Woodbine ed. & Samuel E. Thorne trans.,
Harv. Univ. Press 1968) (n.d) (stating that juries are composed of 12); 1 COKE, supra
note 81, at 155 (describing the jury as a twelve-person body that rendered unanimous
verdicts and turning to the Bible as the original wellspring for the number 12); 2
MATrHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 141 (London, G.G. & J.
Robinson, Pater-Noster-Row 1794) (stating that ajury was "twelve, and no less").
,09 267 U.S. 87, 108-09 (1925).
"1o See Bates, supra note 61, at 64.
' See Williams, 399 U.S. at 92-99 (providing an overview of constitutional history
that casts doubt on the assumption that "if a given feature existed in ajury as common
law in 1789, then it was necessarily preserved in the Constitution"). The article III
clause reads, in pertinent part, "The Trial of all Crimes... shall be by Jury; and such
Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed...."
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
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Convention' sheds little light either way on the intended correlation
between article III's 'jury' and the features of the jury at common
law."" 2  The Court acknowledged that many delegates to the
Constitutional Convention were uncomfortable with article III's
failure to guarantee specifically the common-law right to be tried by a
"jury of the vicinage."" s This discomfort, coupled with a concern that
article III made no specific provisions for trial by jury in civil cases,
led to the introduction of the Sixth and Seventh Amendments in
1791." 4
While it is true, as the Williams majority suggested, that few
records exist of any discussion-favorable or unfavorable-ofjury size
in the Constitutional Convention, this is not dispositive evidence that
the Framers intended to disturb the tradition of twelve-person juries.
In fact, an examination of colonial legislation in the pre-
Revolutionary and Revolutionary eras uncovers considerable evidence
that the Framers simply understood "jury" to mean a unanimous body
of twelve."
5
112 Williams, 399 U.S. at 93 (quoting Felix Frankfurter & Thomas G. Corcoran,Petty
Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial byJury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917, 969
(1926)).
113 Id.
'1 See id. at 93-94 (describing the origin of the Sixth and Seventh Amendments).
For a more detailed analysis of the discomfort specific to civil cases and the historical
background of the Seventh Amendment, see Arnold, supra note 74, at 15-18, which
explains that in order to have the Constitution ratified, the Framers had to concede to
the anti-Federalists that an amendment including a specific right to a civil jury trial
would be among the first acts of the first Congress. See also Stephan Landsman, The
Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated History, 44 HASTINGS LJ. 579, 598
(1993) (suggesting that since the need for civil juries in America to counterbalance
the English colonial judges appointed by the Crown had disappeared with the
Revolution, many delegates trusted their elected officials to protect their rights,
makingjuries in civil cases unnecessary); Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History
of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REv. 639, 661-62 (1973) (noting that the Framers'
failure to include a civiljury right in the text of the Constitution nearly doomed its
ratification).
"' Instructions in no less than six colonial charters (New Hampshire, New York,
Pennsylvania, Plymouth Plantation, Virginia, and West Jersey) specified that trial by
jury in criminal cases meant trial by a panel of 12 indifferent members of the
community reaching a unanimous verdict. For the specific language of these charter
provisions, see generally 1-4 FOUNDATIONS OF COLONIAL AMERICA (W. Kavenagh ed.,
1973). For a brief summary of the provisions, see Bates, supra note 61, at 65. Three
state constitutions ratified prior to the Federal Constitution made similar provisions
for criminal trials in those states. SeeN.C. CONST. of 1776, art. IX ("[N]o freeman shall
be convicted of any crime, but by the unanimous verdict of ajury of good and lawful
men .... "); VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. 1, art. X ("[I]n all prosecutions for criminal
offences, a man hath a right to... a speedy public trial, by an impartial jury of the
country; without the unanimous consent of which jury he cannot be found
[Vol. 146:621
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As the Williams Court noted, the proposed text of the Sixth
Amendment, as introduced by James Madison in the House of
Representatives of the First Congress, stated, in pertinent part: "'The
trial of all crimes ... shall be by an impartial jury of freeholders of the
vicinage, with the requisite of unanimity for conviction, of the right of
challenge, and other accustomed requisites... . 116 Although this
text passed the House virtually unchanged, it created heated debate
in the Senate" 7 and was returned to the House in the substantially
different form that ultimately became the text of the Sixth
Amendment."1
8
The Williams Court found this legislative history dispositive of the
First Senate's interpretation that the vicinage requirement was a
nonessential part of common-law trial by jury. 9 By the Court's
reasoning, this suggested that the conceptualization of the common-
law jury as a whole was not perceived by the First Senate as
immutable, and that since other language of the Madison draft,
including the "accustomed requisites" provision, was also eliminated,
these actions should be read as substantive deletions.20 The Court
concluded that since Congress used explicit language to incorporate
other aspects of the common-law jury system, its failure to explicitly
incorporate the twelve-person requirement suggested a deliberate
guilty.... "); VA. CONsT. of 1776, B.P, § 8 ("[I]n all capital or criminal prosecutions a
man hath a right to... a speedy trial by an impartial jury of twelve men of his vicinage,
without whose unanimous consent he cannot be found guilty...."). For a more
extensive treatment of these provisions, see 1-7 FRANcAs NEWTON THORPE, THE
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTrrtrIONS (1909).
"6 Williams, 399 U.S. at 94 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435 (Joseph Gales ed.,
1789)).
117 See id. at 94. The cause for the Senate's concern is not known definitively, since
records of this debate are not available. The personal journal of Senator William
Maclay served as the primary source of legislative history from the First Senate.
Unfortunately, Senator Maclay was ill and absent from the Senate during the entirety
of debate on the Sixth and Seventh Amendments. No other direct records of the
debate survive. See id. at 95 n.38 (noting the absence of Sen. Maclay).
'18 See id. at 96. For the text of the pertinent parts of the Amendment, see supra
note 5.
"9 See Williams, 399 U.S. at 96. Note, however, that although the English term
"vicinage" was removed from the text of the Sixth Amendment, it was merely
translated, in the Senate version, to its American counterparts "State" and "district,"
producing no meaningful change to the common-law conceptualization of trial by
jury. SeeU.S. CONST. amend. VI.
,20 See Williams, 399 U.S. at 97 (interpreting the language omissions as substantive
changes to the common-law right). It could, of course, be argued that the "other
accustomed requisites" language was simply removed because it was perceived by the
Senate as a redundancy.
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intention not to do so.
This argument raises a number of objections. The entire Senate
debate that led to the reworking of the Madison draft apparently
stemmed from concerns about the applicability of the vicinage
requirement. A letter written by James Madison establishes as
conclusively as possible, given surviving evidence, that the Senate
debate centered entirely on this issue and never addressed the issue
of jury size.'2 The vicinage requirement, which developed as an
English geographical standard based on England's division into
"hundreds" and counties, was a procedural element of jury selection
that is clearly distinguishable from substantive components of jury
composition and function, such as jury size and verdict unanimity. It
was also difficult to translate and apply to an America of different
geographical and political divisions. This argument is supported by
the Senate's preference for expressing the vicinage right in terms of1 '* • - 124
America's geographical and political subdivisions. It is almost
certain that the common-law jury requirement of "vicinage" was
eliminated due to concerns about its clarity and applicability in the
American colonies.'2 The Williams Court's supposition that the
Senate also intended to discard the twelve-person jury requirement,
however, was poorly substantiated. 1
6
The Williams majority defended its interpretation by focusing on
121 See id. at 96-97 (using the vicinage requirement's history to conclude that such a
requirement was not considered essential in the common-law trial byjury).
12 See Arnold, supra note 74, at 16 ("[T]he failure to include a right to a civil trial
was nearly a fatal blow to the new Constitution ... and created a wave of protest.").
12 James Madison wrote:
[The Senate is] inflexible in opposing a definition of the locality of Juries.
The vicinage they contend is either too vague or too strict a term; too vague if
depending on limits to be fixed by the pleasure of the law, too strict if limited
to the county. It was proposed to insert after the wordJuries [in the proposed
amendment], "with the accustomed requisites," leaving the definition to be
construed according to the judgment of professional men. Even this could
not be obtained .... The Senate suppose ... that the provision for vicinage in
the Judiciary bill will sufficiently quiet the fears which called for an
amendment on this point.
Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Sept. 14, 1789), in 1 LETrERS AND
OTHER WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON 492-93 (New York, R Worthington 1865).
.24 See generally Williams, 399 U.S. at 95-98 (discussing the meaning associated with
the excision of the vicinage requirement).
'2 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
'26 See Bates, supra note 61, at 66 (claiming that the convention delegates' lack of
debate on ajury requirement for criminal cases may indicate that such a requirement
was presumed to be included).
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the Senate's simultaneous removal of the "'accustomed requisites'"
clause, insisting that its excision was intended to have "substantive
effect."1'2  As previously noted, however, there is no official record of
these debates. What little legislative history that remains is devoid
of any evidence suggesting that the removal of the "accustomed
requisites" clause was anything more than a housekeeping action by
the Senate to avoid a perceived redundancy.'2
At the time the Constitution was drafted, the twelve-person
unanimous criminal jury was an institution with a nearly four-
hundred-year-old tradition in England. It was brought over and
immediately integrated, unchanged, into pre-Revolutionary War
America. Thus, "it seems clear that to most of the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention in 1787, trial by jury in criminal cases
meant trial by a body of twelve persons all of whom agreed to the
verdict."'30 As Bates has noted, given what is known about the
vigorous debate between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists over
civil jury-trial requirements under the Seventh Amendment, 3 ' the
absence of any recorded discussions about criminal juries before,
during, or after the Convention strongly suggests that the long-
established, highly functional common-law tradition of the twelve-
person criminaljury was never challenged by the delegates.1
2
The strongest evidence that the Framers tacitly accepted the
twelve-person criminal jury is found in the flurry of state-court
decisions interpreting the "jury" requirement immediately after the
Constitutional Convention.' 3 Curiously, the Court found nothing
27 Williams, 399 U.S. at 97.
Seesupra note 117.
129 See Bates, supra note 61, at 66 ("'[A] ccustomed requisites' were thought to be
already included in the concept of jury' .....
IS Id.
". See Arnold, sura note 74, at 15-16 (detailing the battle over the Seventh
Amendment).
"7 SeeBates, supra note 61, at 66.
" See Foote v. Lawrence, 1 Stew. 483, 483 (Ala. 1828) ("The term jury is well
understood to be twelve men .... ."); Vaughn v. Scade, 30 Mo. 600, 604 (1860) ("The
term 'trial by jury' was well known and understood at the common law, and in that
sense it was adopted in our bill of rights."); Legislative Power to Change Law in
Relation to Juries, Op. Justices Supreme Judicial Court, 41 N.H. 550, 551 (1860) ("A
jury for the trial of a cause was a body of twelve men ... who.., must return their
unanimous verdict...."); Cancemi v. NewYork, 18 N.Y. 128, 138 (1858) ("It would be
a highly dangerous innovation, in reference to criminal cases, upon the ancient and
invaluable institution of trial by jury, and the constitution and laws establishing and
securing that mode of trial, for the court to allow any number short of a full panel of
twelve jurors .... "); Whitehurst v. Davis, 3 N.C. (2 Hayw.) 113, 113 (1800)
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compelling in this significant body of contemporaneous judicial
opinion, and even disregarded its own numerous prior opinions on
the subject.'3 The fact that the Court shunned such substantial
evidence supporting the retention of the twelve-person jury standard
in favor of a considerably weaker legislative-history argument that
scholars have called "twisted"35 and "alarming"86 arouses suspicion
that other motives must have driven the Court to its holding.
The Court admitted in Williams that, given the lack of legislative
history on the subject, it was not able "to divine precisely what the
word 'jury' imported to the Framers, the First Congress, or the States
in 1789."137 The Court even conceded that "[i]t may well [have been]
that the usual expectation was that the jury would consist of 12 .""'
The Court, however, did not explain why the overwhelming evidence
provided by subsequent state constitutional enactments and
contemporaneous judicial decisions was not used to ascertain what
the missing legislative history might have revealed.
Anticipating the firestorm of criticism that would result from its
decision, the Court preempted critics by suggesting that "the most
likely conclusion to be drawn [from our decision] is simply that little
thought was actually given to the specific question we face today."' 9
Closer to the truth, perhaps, is what Justice Harlan stated in his
concurrence: that a great deal of thought went into the Williams
opinion, thought centering primarily on Federalist concerns and a
preordained conclusion that the Sixth Amendment right to a twelve-
person jury in criminal trials had to be abandoned in the wake of
(interpreting the state constitutional requirement of "trial by jury" to mean that "any
innovation amounting in the least degree to a departure from the ancient mode, may
cause a departure in other instances, and in the end, endanger or pervert this
excellent institution from its usual course"); Work v. State, 2 Ohio St. 296, 304 (1853)
("The number must be twelve, they must be impartially selected, and must
unanimously concur...."); Emerick v. Harris, 1 Binn. 416, 426 (Pa. 1808)
(interpreting Pennsylvania's constitutional provision that "trial by jury shall be as
heretofore," by referring to William Penn's charter of 1682, stating that"all trials shall
be of 12 men"); Zylstra v. Corporation of Charleston, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 382, 395-96
(1794) (noting that the structure of the jury, as contemplated at the time of the
adoption of the South Carolina Constitution, included 12 members).
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
Bates, supra note 61, at 68.
Arnold, supra note 74, at 35.
137 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 98 (1970).
lId.




III. THE CURRENT STATUS OF STATE CRIMINAL-JURY REQUIREMENTS
The Court's decisions in Duncan, Williams, Ballew, Apodaca, and
Burch have permitted a chaotic system of jury requirements to prevail
among the states, a system which Justice Harlan, in his Williams
concurrence, referred to as "constitutional schizophrenia."
14' At the
time Williams was decided, four states had already departed from the
twelve-person jury standard and were allowing juries of fewer than
twelve members to decide felony cases. In addition, a number of
other states provided for reduced juries or bench trials for other non-
felonious offenses. 4
Although the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure continue to
prescribe a twelve-person jury requirement," these rules only directly
apply to the narrow subset of criminal cases tried in federal courts. In
all other cases, states are free to decide their own requirements.
Today, only seven states specifically require a twelve-member jury in
all criminal cases.' Five other states either preserve the
140 See id. at 134-38 (Harlan, J., concurring injudgment) ("The best evidence of the
vitality of federalism is today's decision in Wllias ..... 'Incorporation' in Duncan
closed the door on the debate . . ").
41 Id. at 136 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). For further treatment of these
cases, see supra notes 42, 57 and accompanying text.
142 See id. at 99 n.45 (citing the relevant constitutional and statutory sections that
permitted departures from the twelve-person jury standard in Louisiana, South
Carolina, Texas, and Utah).
4 See id. at 136-42 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment) (citing three states that
allowed nonjury trials in nonfelony cases punishable by more than one year's
imprisonment, eight states that permitted six-person juries for cases involving
misdemeanors, and five states that allowed bench trials for cases involving
misdemeanors).
" The Federal Rule provides:
Juries shall be of 12 but at any time before verdict the parties may stipulate in
writing with the approval of the court that the jury shall consist of any number
less than 12 or that a valid verdict may be returned by ajury of less than 12
should the court find it necessary to excuse one or more jurors for any just
cause after trial commences.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b). The Advisory Committee notes made prior to the 1944
adoption of this rule suggest that it contemplates either an agreement before trial to try
the case before ajury of fewer than 12 members, ora similar agreement arising during
trial in the event that ajuror or jurors must be excused from jury service. See FED. P.
CRIM. P. 23 advisory committee's note.
' See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 11 (requiring an impartial jury of 12 in all criminal
prosecutions); ThX. CONST. art. 5, § 13 (requiring petit juries in the district courts to
be composed of 12, but allowing a nonunanimous verdict of at least nine out of 12 in
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constitutional right to trial by jury "inviolate" or retain state
constitutional provisions echoing the language of the Sixth Amend-
ment.16  Cases interpreting such language, however, illustrate that
jury size has hardly remained inviolate, and any semblance of a
consistent standard has been severely eroded.1
A number of states have settled the issue by statute, setting the
baseline for criminal-jury size at twelve but allowing that number to
be reduced with the consent of both parties and the court.' 48  This
nonfelony cases); W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 14 (providing that trials of felonies and
misdemeanors require ajury of 12 men); HAW. REV. STAT. § 635-26 (1985) ("The clerk
of the court shall draw by lot such jury, to the number of twelve .... ."); N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 270.05 (McKinney 1993) ("A trial jury consists of twelve jurors .... ");
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1201 (1988) ("In all criminal cases the defendant has the right
to be tried by ajury of 12 whose verdict must be unanimous."); ME. R. Cr. 23(a)(1)
("In all criminal jury cases the jury shall consist of twelve (12) members.").
46 SeeILL. CONST. art. I, § 13 ("The right of trial byjury as heretofore enjoyed shall
remain inviolate."); MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XII ("[Tihe legislature shall not make any
law, that shall subject any person to a capital or infamous punishment ... without trial
byjury."); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 5 (amended 1912) ("The right of trial by jury shall be
inviolate .... ."); OR. CONST. art. I, § 11 (stating that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall have the right to public trial by an impartial jury," although allowing for
agreement among only 10 out of 12 jurors in noncapital felony cases in the circuit
courts); TENN. CONsT. art. I, § 6 ("[T] he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate
... ."). Ohio courts, however, have ruled that Criminal Rule 23(B), which states that
"[iun misdemeanor cases juries shall consist of eight," does not violate Ohio's
constitutional provision. See Columbus v. Boyland, 391 N.E.2d 324, 326 (Ohio 1979)
(stating that Rule 23(B) does not alter a defendant's substantive constitutional rights,
but "merely prescribes the method by which the substantive right is to be executed").
1 See, e.g., State v. Bobo, 814 S.W.2d 353, 359 (Tenn. 1991) (interpreting
"inviolate" to permit a defendant to consent to a trial with fewer than 12jurors).
"8 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-15-106 (1995) ("A trial jury consists of 12 persons or,
with the approval of the court, it may consist of any number less than 12 upon which
the parties agree in open court."); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 175.021(2) (Michie 1992)
("IJ]uries must consist of 12 jurors, but at any time before verdict, the parties may
stipulate in writing with the approval of the court that the jury consist of any number
less than 12 but not less than six."); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2B:23-1(a) (West 1996) ("Juries
in criminal cases shall consist of 12 persons. Except in trials of crimes punishable by
death, the parties in criminal cases may stipulate in writing, before the verdict and
with court approval, that the jury shall consist of fewer than 12 persons."); S.D.
CODIFIED LAws § 23A-18-2 (Michie 1988) ("Juries shall consist of twelve members but
at any time before verdict the parties may stipulate in writing or orally on the record
with the approval of the court that the jury shall consist of any number less than
twelve."); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 756.096(3) (a) (West 1996) ("Ajury in felony cases shall
consist of 12 persons unless both parties agree on a lesser number... ."); DEL SUP.
Cr. CRIM. R 23(b) ("Juries shall be of 12 but at any time before verdict the parties may
stipulate in writing with the approval of the court that the jury shall consist of any
number less than 12 or that a valid verdict may be returned by ajury of less than 12....");
MD. R CRIM. CAUSEs 4-311(b) ("A jury shall consist of 12 persons unless the parties
stipulate at any time in writing or on the record that the jury shall consist of any
number less than 12."); PA. R. CRIM. P. 1103 (providing that "in all cases the defendant
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arrangement, however, has allowed jury size to become a bargaining
chip in pretrial negotiations.4 9 Another group of states requires a
twelve-person jury in felony criminal cases but allows the parties and
the court to agree to a lesser number in misdemeanor cases.' 50 A
third group of states now requires a jury of twelve only in their
highest-level trial courts.'5'
at any time before verdict may agree, with the consent of his attorney, and approval by
a judge of the court in which the case is pending, to be tried by a jury of less than
twelve but not less than six," but noting through an advisory comment that this
procedure is intended to apply only in situations where a twelve-person jury has
initially been sworn); R-I. Cr. R. ANN. 23(b) ("Juries shall be of twelve (12) but at any
time before verdict the parties may in open court stipulate in writing with the approval
of the court that the jury shall consist of any number less than twelve (12)."); VT. RK
CRIM. P. 23(b) ("The parties may stipulate in writing that the jury shall consist of any
number less than twelve with the approval of the court."); W. VA. Cr. K. 23(b) ("Juries
shall be of 12, but at any time before verdict the parties may stipulate in writing with
the approval of the court that the jury shall consist of any number less than 12 or that
a valid verdict may be returned by a jury of less than 12 should the court find it
necessary to excuse one or morejurors for anyjust cause after trial commences.").
"' See State v. Griffith, 561 So. 2d 528, 537 (Fla. 1990) (describing a prosecutor's
waiver of the death penalty in exchange for the defendant's agreement to a trial
before a panel of six); State v. Long, No. 01C01-9201CC00026, 1992 WL 389627, at *2
(Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 31, 1992) (discussing the defendant's submission of his case
to a six-person jury in exchange for the prosecutor's stipulation to the authenticity of a
transcript of the preliminary hearing).
', See CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 16 ("In criminal actions in which a misdemeanor is
charged, the jury shall consist of 12 persons or a lesser number agreed on by the
parties in open court."); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 20 ("[A]n impartial jury... may consist
of less than 12jurors in prosecutions for misdemeanors punishable by imprisonment
for not more than 1 year. ... "); N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 18a ("The legislature may
provide that in any court of original jurisdiction a jury shall be composed of six or of
twelve persons.., provided, however, that crimes prosecuted by indictment shall be
tried by ajury composed of twelve persons .... "); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 19 ("Juries
for the trial of... felony criminal cases shall consist of twelve (12) persons. All other
juries shall consist of six (6) persons. However, in all cases the parties may agree on a
lesser number ofjurors than provided herein . . . .");WYO. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("Ajury
in ... criminal cases where the charge is a misdemeanor may consist of less than
twelve (12) persons but not less than six (6), as may be prescribed by law.").
'51 See GA. CONsT. art. I, para. XI(b) ("A trial jury shall consist of 12 persons; but
the General Assembly may prescribe any number, not less than six, to constitute a trial
jury in courts of limitedjurisdiction . .. ."); IOWA CONST. art. I, § 9 ("The right of trial
byjury shall remain inviolate; but the General Assembly may authorize trial by ajury of
a less number than twelve men in inferior courts ... ."); Mo. CONsT. art. I, § 22(a)
("[A] jury for the trial of criminal.., cases in courts not of record may consist of less
than twelve citizens as may be prescribed by law ... ."); NEB. CONsT. art. I, § 6 ("The
right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, but the Legislature may authorize trial by
jury of a less number than twelve in courts inferior to the District Court.. .. ");N.M.
CONsT. art. I, § 12 ("The right of trial by jury as it has heretofore existed shall be
secured to all and remain inviolate. In all cases triable in courts inferior to the district
court the jury may consist of six."); S.C. CONST. art. V, § 22 ("The petit jury of the
Circuit Court shall consist of twelve members and the number ofjurors of other courts
1998]
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Many states make a clearer distinction, either by statute or
constitutional provision, requiring that juries in all felony cases be
composed of twelve members, but allowing all other cases to be tried• • 152
by a jury of a lesser number, most commonly Six. Indiana has even
drawn the line within its felony crimes, requiring a twelve-person jury
for some felonies but not for others.5 3 Other states have eroded the
twelve-person standard even further by requiring ajury of twelve only
in capital cases where a sentence of death or imprisonment for more
must be determined by law."); WASH. CONSr. art. I, § 21 ("The right of trial by jury
shall remain inviolate, but the legislature may provide for a jury of any number less
than twelve in courts not of record...."); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29A.280 (Michie
1992) ("Juries for all trials in Circuit Court [higher court] shall be composed of twelve
(12) persons. Juries for all trials in District Court [lower court] shall be composed of
six (6) persons. In Circuit Court... the parties with the approval of the court may
stipulate that the jury shall consist of any number less than twelve (12), except that no
jury shall consist of less than six.").
112 See GA. CONST. art. I, para. XI(b) ("A trial jury shall consist of 12 persons; but
the General Assembly may prescribe any number, not less than six, to constitute a trial
jury in ... misdemeanor cases."); MINN. CONsT. art. I, § 6 ("In all prosecutions of
crimes defined by law as felonies, the accused has the right to ajury of 12 members.
In all other criminal prosecutions, the legislature may provide for the number of
jurors, provided that ajury have at least six... ."); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-406 (Supp.
1996) ("[E]very person accused of a felony has the right to be tried by ajury of twelve
whose verdict shall be unanimous. In matters involving misdemeanors, the accused is
entitled to be tried by ajury of six."); IDAHO CODE § 23(c) (1996) ("In a felony case
the jury shall consist of twelve (12) jurors or any lesser number upon which the party
may agree upon the record or in open court. In a misdemeanor case the jury shall
consist of six (6) jurors or any lesser number upon which the parties may agree upon
the record or in open court."); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3403 to -3404 (1995) ("Ajury in
a felony case shall consist of twelve members. However the parties may agree in
writing, at any time before the verdict, with the approval of the court, that the jury
shall consist of any number less than twelve .... Ajury in a misdemeanor.., case shall
consist of six members."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-17-12 (1991) ("In all felony cases
when a jury is impaneled, a jury must consist of twelve qualified jurors. In class A
misdemeanor cases when a jury is impaneled, the jury must consist of six qualified
jurors unless the defendant makes a timely written demand for ajury of twelve. In all
other misdemeanor cases ... [a] jury must consist of six qualified jurors."); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 601 (West 1992) ("Thejury consists of twelve persons except that
in misdemeanors it shall consist of six persons."); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 136.210
(Michie Supp. 11 1996) ("[Iun criminal cases the trial jury shall consist of 12 persons
unless the parties consent to a lesser number.... In criminal cases.., in which the
only charges to be tried are misdemeanors, the trial jury shall consist of six persons.");
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-262(2) (Michie 1995) ("Twelve persons from a panel of twenty
shall constitute a jury in a felony case. Seven persons from a panel of thirteen shall
constitute ajury in a misdemeanor case.").
153 See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-1-1 (West 1996) ("If a defendant is charged with:
murder, a Class A felony, a Class B felony or a Class C felony, the jury shall consist of
twelve (12) .... [For] any other crime [including Class D felonies like theft], the jury
shall consist of six (6).").
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than thirty years may be imposed.'- States applying these standards,
however, frequently allow for these specifically mandated twelve-
person juries to be reduced in size with the agreement of both parties
and the court.'s5 For example, Mississippi has decided, in light of
Williams, that a twelve-person jury is never required. 56  Statutory
provisions in two other states are ambiguous as to the number of
• - 157
jurors required.
The Court's decisions in Williams and its progeny have
perpetuated this confusing array of state criminal-jury requirements.
Under the present regime, depending on the location of the trial, a
154 See ARIZ. CONST. art. I, § 23 ("The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.
Juries in criminal cases in which a sentence of death or imprisonment for thirty years
or more is authorized by law shall consist of twelve persons. [In all criminal cases] the
unanimous consent of the jurors shall be necessary .... In all other cases, the number
of jurors, not less than six, and the number required to render a verdict, shall be
specified by law."); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 19 ("The right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate, the number of such jurors, which shall not be less than six, to be established
by law; but no person shall, for a capital offense, be tried by ajury of less than twelve
jurors without his consent."); LA. CONST. art. I, § 17 ("A criminal case in which the
punishment may be capital shall be tried before ajury of twelve persons, all of whom
must concur .... A case in which the punishment is necessarily confinement at hard
labor shall be tried before ajury of twelve persons, ten of whom must concur .... A
case in which the punishment may be confinement at hard labor or confinement
without hard labor for more than six months shall be tried before ajury of six persons,
five of whom must concur. .. ."); UTAH CONSr. art. I, § 10 ("In capital cases the right
of trial byjury shall remain inviolate... [E]xcept in capital cases, ajury shall consist of
eightjurors."); ALA. CODE § 18.1(c) (1990) ("At the commencement of trial, or at any
time before the return of a verdict, and with the consent of the court, the [parties]
may stipulate in writing, or in open court upon the record, that the jury may consist of
any number ofjurors less than twelve (12) and more than five (5) .... In any trial by a
jury of less than twelve (12), the verdict must be unanimous. This section does not
apply to prosecutions of capital offenses."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 913.10 (West 1996)
("Twelve persons shall constitute ajury to try all capital cases, and six persons shall
constitute ajury to try all other criminal cases.").
... See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
,s See MISS. CONST. art. I, § 31 (stating that although the right of trial byjury shall
remain inviolate, it does not mandate a twelve-person jury in any court).
-17 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 234, §§ 25-26 (Law. Co-op. 1986) (failing to state a
required number ofjurors); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 606:8 (1986) (stating that "[s]ix
persons shall constitute a jury for the trial in the superior court of any offense
punishable by imprisonment for any period not exceeding one year," but not stating
the required number for more serious crimes). But see Opinion of the Justices, 431
A.2d 135, 136-37 (1981) (noting that N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 606:8 has never come
before the court for its consideration, that "no body of less than twelve men ... would
be ajury within the meaning of the constitution," quoting Opinion of the Justices, 41
N.H. 550, 552 (1860), and affirming that "the vitality of [that] conclusion remains
today, especially in light of the number of empirical studies that have questioned the
impact of the six-memberjury on our court system").
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defendant facing charges of second-degree murder, a noncapital
felony in most states, may be guaranteed ajury of twelve, may have to
request specifically a jury of twelve, may be tried before a jury of any
number between six and twelve, or may face definitively a jury of six.
As the next Part will show, the size of the jury this defendant
ultimately faces can play a significant, perhaps even definitive, role in
the outcome of her trial.
IV. SOCIAL-SCIENCE RESEARCH ONJURY SIZE DEMANDS
A TWELVE-PERSON STANDARD
According to the W/lliams Court, "the essential feature of ajury... lies
in the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the
commonsense judgment of a group of laymen, and in the community
participation and shared responsibility that results from that group's
determination of guilt or innocence."' Based on this statement of a
jury's purpose, the size and composition of the jury is of obvious
importance. The Court explicitly recognized this, stating that the
"number of the body that makes up the jury .... should... be large
enough to promote group deliberation, free from outside attempts at
intimidation, and to provide a fair possibility for obtaining a
representative cross-section of the community."5 9 Despite its clear
emphasis on these considerations, the Williams Court, citing six social-
science "experiments,"' 6° found "little reason to think that these goals
are in any meaningful sense less likely to be achieved when the jury
numbers six, than when it numbers 12, ,16' and that the overall
reliability of the jury probably was not a function of its size.' 62
A. The Court's Flawed Conclusion in Williams
The Court's reliance in Williams on the six "experiments" it cited
in reaching its conclusions about jury function has generated a
M Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
159 Id.
" The six social-science experiments cited are: Philip M. Cronin, Six-MemberJuries
in District Courts, BOSTON B.J., Apr. 1958, at 27; NewJersey Experiments with Six-ManJuy,
BuLL. SEC. JUD. ADMIN. ABA, May 1966, at 9; Richard H. Phillips, A Jury of Six in All
Cases, 30 CONN. B.J. 354 (1956); Six-Memberfuries Tried in Massachusetts District Court, 42
J. AM. JUD. Soc. 136 (1958); Edward A. Tamm, The Five-Man CivilJury: A Proposed
Constitutional Amendment, 51 GEO. L.J. 120 (1962); and Lloyd L. Wiehl, The Six Man
Jury, 4 GONZ. L. REV. 35 (1968). See Williams, 399 U.S. at 101 n.48.
'6' Williams, 399 U.S. at 100.
162 See id. at 100-01.
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firestorm of criticism. ' 6 The Court expressly stated that its decision
turned not on a question of law or history but on "a functional
analysis of the jury purpose."'" Thus, the central questions before the
Court were whether a jury's representative makeup, deliberative
'63 See, e.g., Bernard Grofman, The Slippery Slope: Jury Size and Jury Verdict
Requirements-Legal and Social Science Approaches, 2 LAw & POL'Y Q. 285, 295 (1980)
(agreeing with the criticisms of Saks, supra note 1, of the four "experiments" cited in
Williams); David Kaye, And Then There Were Twelve: Statistical Reasoning, the Supreme
Court, and the Size of the Juy, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1004, 1004 (1980) (noting that "[i]t was
readily shown that [the studies relied upon in Williams] were inconclusive and had
little bearing on the question of how size affects jury verdicts"); Richard 0. Lempert,
Uncovering "Nondiscernible"Differences: Empirical Research and theJury-Size Cases, 73 MICH.
L. REV. 643, 645 (1975) (noting that the Court in Williams "considerably overstated"
the results of the experiments it cited, and that Professor Zeisel was "gentle with the
Court" in not overstating "the majority's extreme disingenuousness in citing these
reports as experiments and in relying on them"); Robert T. RoperJury Size and Verdict
Consistency: "A Line Has to Be Drawn Somewhere"?, 14 L. & SOC'Y REV. 977, 978 (1980)
(noting that the studies cited by the Williams Court were "largely descriptive"); Saks,
supra note 1, at 18-20 (discussing the inherently fatal flaws of each experiment); Hans
Zeisel, ... And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the FederalJury, 38 U. CHI. L.
REV. 710, 712-15 (1971) [hereinafter Zeisel I] (uncovering personal biases and other
problems infecting the conclusions of each of the six experiments); Hans Zeisel, The
Waning of the American Jury, 58 A.B.A. J. 367, 367-69 (1972) [hereinafter Zeisel II]
(concluding that the Supreme Court used poor reasoning and misinterpreted
available data to support its decision); Hans Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond,
"ConvincingEmpirical Evidence" on the Six MemberJury, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 282 (1974)
(noting that the Court "was misled in believing that there was ... evidence" in the
experiments proving that a reduction injury size would not affect trial results);Joan B.
Kessler, Note, An Empirical Study of Six- and Twelve-Member Jury Decision-Making Processes,
6 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 712, 714-15 (1973) (noting that the experiments relied on in
Williams "are not the product of disciplined, empirical research ... [and] should be
viewed with some skepticism... [since] the evidence is used to support a proposition
of great importance to trial by jury"); Lawrence R. Mills, Note, Six-Member and Twelve-
Member Juries: An Empirical Study of Trial Results, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 671, 672
(1973) (stating that the evidence relied upon in Williams is "not highly persuasive,"
because the cited studies represent "merely the personal opinions of several judges,
lawyers, and court clerks"); David F. Walbert, Note, TheEffect ofJury Size on the Probability
of Conviction, 22 CASEW. RES. L. REV. 529, 532 (1971) (concluding that "[n] either the
reasoning of the opinion nor the references relied upon support the Court's
conclusion.").
Social scientist Hans Zeisel, whose collaborative work, HARRY KALVEN & HANS
ZEISEL, THE AiERICANJuRY (1966), was cited by the Williams majority, was one of the
most outspoken critics of the Williams decision. According to Zeisel, the Williams
majority badly misinterpreted his findings. See Angelo Valenti & Leslie Downing, Six
Versus Twelve Member Juries: An Experimental Test of the Supreme Court Assumption of
FunctionalEquivalence; 1 PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 273, 273 (1974) ("Zeisel... who
along with Kalven wrote The American Jury, a work heavily cited by the Supreme Court
in the [Williams] decision, argued that the Court had misinterpreted the findings of
The American Jury and that 6 member juries are not functionally equivalent to 12
memberjuries.").
'64 Saks, supra note 1, at 18.
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processes, likelihood of conviction, minority ability to resist majority
pressure, and verdict reliability would differ significantly between six-
and twelve-person juries.' Despite the fact that, as Michael Saks has
pointed out, "the opinion stated that the case entirely turned on this
set of empirical questions," the Court's treatment of these issues
spanned only three paragraphs of the twenty-six-page majority
opinion.'66
More critically, however, the Court's cursory evaluation of the six
social-science "experiments" was deeply flawed, leading to the
inaccurate conclusion that there were "no discernible difference s]"
between six- and twelve-person juries on the aforementioned
167factors. Closer inspection of the experiments cited in footnote
forty-eight of the Williams majority opinion reveals that they are,
empirically speaking, entirely unreliable, and in fact are not
"experiments" at all. 16 8
In the first of these articles, Judge Lloyd Wiehl cited only Charles
169Joiner's anecdotal reports in Civil Justice and the Jury,' and Judge
Wiehl's own unsupported assertions, to conclude that six- and twelve-
person juries deliberate identically. 70 Judge Wiehl's article offered
no empirical justification for such a conclusion.17 1 Similarly, Judge
Edward Tamm relied only on his "satisfactory" experiences presiding
over five-person juries hearing condemnation trials in the District of
Columbia to draw his conclusions about the deliberative equivalence
of six- and twelve-person juries. Consequently, Judge Tamm's
article is devoid of the empirically verifiable evidence necessary to
make his claim anything more than anecdotal.1 73
The Philip Cronin article, which reports the results of an
165 See id, see also Williams, 399 U.S. at 100 (establishing these purposes as the
essential functions and features of ajury).
'6 Saks, supra note 1, at 18.
167 Williams, 399 U.S. at 101.
16' See, e.g., Lempert, supra note 163, at 645 (noting the majority's "extreme
disingenuousness in citing these reports as experiments and in relying on them").
" CHARLES W. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 82-83 (1962) (arguing that
there is no evidence to show thatjury deliberation requires 12 people).
170 See Wiehl, supra note 160, at 39-44, 39 ("It seems that a six-man jury could
deliberate equally as well [as a twelve-man jury] . . ").
1 See Zeisel I, supra note 163, at 714 (noting that Wiehl's article, supra note 160,
"does not have any evidence" for its conclusion).
172 See Tamm, supra note 160, at 136-38 (discussing his 14 years of experience
presiding over five-personjuries).
173 See Zeisel I, supra note 163, at 714-15 (suggesting that specific data is needed to
make accurate findings in the realm of social sciences).
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experimental reduction in civil-jury size sanctioned by the
Massachusetts legislature, 74 suffers from the same lack of empirically
verifiable evidence that plagues Judge Tamm's article. 7s Although
forty-three trials were observed, conclusions as to the equivalence of
six- and twelve-person juries were based solely on the personal
perceptions of the court clerk and three attending lawyers.
7 6
The fourth "authoritative" study cited as support by the Williams
Court was a duplicative review of the Massachusetts experiment
previously described. 77 The fifth study provides even less authority
than the previous studies. Although it stated that "the Monmouth
County Court had experimented with the use of a six-man jury in a
civil negligence case," 78 the study never drew any conclusions as to
the jury's effectiveness.'79  Finally, Judge Richard Phillips's article
merely suggested the potential economic advantages to be derived
from the reduction in jury size from twelve to six in all noncapital
cases.180  Judge Phillips, however, never addressed the potential
functional consequences of such a reduction."" Taken individually or
collectively, these "authoritative experiments" provided "scant
evidence by any standards,"'8 2 because "[n]ot one of the references
even began to address competently the empirical questions the Court
17 See Cronin, supra note 160, at 27-29 (assessing the Massachusetts experiment
with six-person juries in district courts and noting generally favorable responses from
participating lawyers).
'7S Zeisel I, supra note 163, at 714 (discussing the Massachusetts study of six-person
juries).
176 See Saks, supra note 1, at 18; Zeisel I, supra note 163, at 714. One of the three
observing lawyers later testified that he found there to be no significant differences
between the verdicts of smaller juries and twelve-person juries because "[tihere seems
to be no particular reason why the size of a finding would be affected by [the size of
the jury]." Zeisel I, supra note 163, at 714. Even disregarding the fact that this
testimony employs circular reasoning, it also suggests that this observer failed to even
consider the possibility that changes injury size could affect jury deliberations and
verdicts.
'77 See Six-Member Juries Tred in Massachusetts District Court, supra note 160, at 136
(concluding that "the lawyers who use the District Court, as well as the clerk, report
that the verdicts [of six-memberjuries] are no different than those returned by twelve-
member juries"). As has been stated previously, these reports were based solely on
qualitative observations and were devoid of any empirical grounding.
'78 New Jersey Experiments with Six-ManJury, supra note 160, at 6.
'79 See Zeisel I, supra note 163, at 714-15.
'a' See Phillips, supra note 160, at 357 (estimating a savings to Connecticut of
approximately $75,000 per year in 1950s' dollars).
... See id. at 357 ("[B]oth the complete jury trial and the innumerable partialjury
trials would be shortened and made more businesslike with ajury limited to six.").
112 Zeisel I, supra note 163, at 715.
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posed for itself."'8
Additionally, in footnote forty-nine of the Williams opinion, the
Court made a number of errors interpreting well-established,
empirical social-science research-mistakes that Saks has labeled even
"more incredible" than the Court's previous misinterpretations. 8
For example, one of the most widely recognized studies"5 in social
psychology focusing on conformity and peer influence has
established that the presence of a single ally is the most powerful
facilitator of minority resistance to majority pressure. 116 Applied to
the jury context, the finding suggests that a panel divided ten to two
will not be functionally identical to a panel split five to one despite the
proportional equivalence of the two juries, because a minority
viewpoint defended by an ally (the ten-to-two case) can be expected
to offer significantly greater resistance to conformity pressure from
the majority than the five-to-one split where the dissenting juror
stands alone. 87 It is the absolute size of the minority faction, not the
proportional equivalence of the minority to the majority, that
determines the minority faction's ability to resist pressure to
conform.8 The Williams Court used this research' 89 to conclude
erroneously that "[s]tudies of the operative factors contributing to
small group deliberation and decisionmaking suggest that jurors in
'8' Saks, supra note 1, at 18 (emphasis added).
184 Id.
'85 See Lempert, supra note 163, at 674 n.94 (stating that the results of this study
have been corroborated by others and are "generally accepted by social-
-psychologists").
,81 See S.E. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure upon the Modification and Distortion of
Judgments, in GROUP DYNAMICS 189, 199 (Dorwin Cartwright ed., 2d ed. 1960)
(summarizing the results of his experiment with group pressure); see also Charles A.
Kiesler, Group Pressure and Conformity, in EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 233, 257
(Judson Mills ed. 1969) (corroborating the Asch findings).
187 See Saks, supra note 1, at 19 (explaining the Court's misinterpretation of this
research).
188 SeeAsch, supra note 186, at 199 ("[T]he majority effect is a function of the size
of group opposition."); Kiesler, supra note 186, at 257 (supporting Asch's finding that
the absolute size of the minority is determinative); Saks, supra note 1, at 19 (stating
that numerous studies have "found that it is the absolute rather than the relative size
of the opposition that determined factional influence.").
,89 In Williams, the Court cited The American Jury and an unpublished thesis to
support the conclusion that minority jurors are influenced by the proportional size of
the majority. 399 U.S. at 101 n.49. Hans Zeisel, co-author of The American Juy,
protested the Court's misinterpretation of the work. See supra note 163. The Williams
Court also referenced the Asch study, which at the time of the Williams decision, was
already the widely corroborated and accepted position in the field, but dismissed its
implications. See Williams, 399 U.S. at 101 n.49.
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the minority... are likely to be influenced by the proportional size of
the majority aligned against them"'--a result "exactly the opposite" of
what Asch's research found. 19'
Finally, the Williams Court took up the issue of community
representation. Without a single authority in its favor, the Court
concluded that, "while in theory the number of viewpoints
represented on a randomly selected jury ought to increase as the size
of the jury increases, in practice the difference between the twelve-
man and the six-man jury in terms of the cross-section of the
community represented seems likely to be negligible.' 92
Saks pointed out that, in reaching this conclusion, the Court
"ignored what is obvious to every social scientist that when sampling
from heterogeneous populations, sample size determines how well
minority groups in the population will be represented."' 93 Saks
illustrated, through simple statistical probability, that reducing ajury
panel from twelve members to six members would cause a significant
reduction in minority representation on the smaller panel.94  He
noted, however, that the use of statistical-sampling theory alone
produces a certain margin of error, and thus, the "sincere empiricist"
would still require "empirical evidence" before accepting its
conclusions.' 9 Consequently, Saks conducted a series of controlled
studies involving twelve- and six-member juries whose members were
drawn from a representative population which was ten percent
African-American. His empirical findings revealed that the actual
difference in minority representation on twelve- and six-member
juries was even more pronounced than the sampling theory had
suggested.'96 Few researchers, Saks concluded, would consider this
,9' Wiliams, 399 U.S. at 101 n.49 (emphasis added).
9 ee Saks, supra note 1, at 19 (stating that a number of empirical studies
contradict the conclusion of the Williams Court); see also Asch, supra note 186, at 198
(reaching the conclusion that the absolute size, not the proportional size, of the
minority opposition was the determinative factor); MIcHAELJ. SAKS,JURYVERDIMrS 16-
18 (1977) (discussing, in detail, the Court's misinterpretation of these studies).
' Williams, 399 U.S. at 102.
195 Saks, supra note 1, at 19.
'9 See id. (illustrating that in a given community population with a 10% minority
composition, sampling theory predicts that 72% of twelve-member panels will contain
one or more minority members, while only 47% of six-memberjuries will).
195 See id. (noting the limitations of sampling theory).
See SAGs, supra note 191, at 90-91 (showing that instead of the 72% to 47%
contrast in minority membership on twelve- and six-person juries, respectively,
predicted by sampling theory, Saks's empirical studies place the contrast at 89% to
41%).
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difference to be, in the words of the Williams Court, "negligible." 97
The Williams Court's use of dubious authority and
misinterpretation or outright dismissal of widely corroborated social-
science research in justifying a departure from the twelve-person
criminal jury standard sparked outrage in the social-science
community. 198 The years following the Williams decision bore witness
to "a veritable industry"'99 of social-science experiments, probing
nearly every possible effect that a reduction in panel size might have
on jury function. 0
B. The Battle Between Law and Social Science in Colgrove v. Battin
After weathering intense criticism from social scientists and
leaders of the legal profession following Williams, the Court in
Colgrove v. Battin2 0 was more cautious in its references to social-
202science research. Unfortunately, because empirically principled
research often requires two to five years from initiation to
203publication, only four subsequent studies involving jury size had
been conducted by the time Colgrove came before the Court.2
Although the fact that the Colgrove Court took pains to locate and
consider only empirical studies "might be viewed as progress,"0 5 the
mere fact that a social-science study involves empirical research does
197 See Saks, supra note 1 at 19 (concluding that representational differences
between twelve- and six-person juries are not negligible as the Williams Court has
stated).
See supra note 163 and accompanying text (highlighting the social-science
community's response to the Williams decision).
' Roper, supra note 163, at 978.
For a comprehensive bibliography of these jury studies, see Norbert L. Kerr &
Robert L. MacCoun, The Effects ofJury Size and Polling Method on the Process and Product of
Juiy Deliberation, 48J. PERSONALITY& SOC. PSYCHOL. 349, 362-63 (1985).
201 413 U.S. 149 (1973). The composition of the Court had changed since the
Williams decision was announced. Justice Black, who wrote a partial dissent in
Williams, retired and was replaced by Justice Powell. Likewise, Justice Harlan, who
wrote a blistering dissenting opinion in Baldwin v. New Yor, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), a
companion case to Williams, favoring the retention of the twelve-person jury, retired,
and was replaced byJustice (now Chief'Justice) Rehnquist.
202 SeeSaks, supra note 1, at 19 (stating that this time around, the "Court did look at
empirical studies and did understand the stated findings.")
'03 Conversation with Dorothy G. Singer, Ed.D, research scientist and Co-Director
of the Yale Television Research and Consultation Center (Nov. 1, 1993).





not render it per se authoritative. The results of an empirical study
are only as good as the methodology used to derive them.0
Although empirical studies conducted with flawed methodologies are
not authoritative, they can be dangerously misleading because their
empirical structure renders them instantly more credible.2 8 Whether
due to a lack of prepublication peer-review by psychological
researchers209 or due to a rush to publish "hot" material, the four
studies210 which the Court in Colgrove claimed provided "convincing
empirical evidence" to buttress the Williams decision actually "said
much less than the Court thought they were saying" due to their
211inherent and rampant methodological problems.
The first of these four studies was a 1973 examination conducted
by Gordon Bermant and Rob Coppock, which found no overall
differences in verdict frequency linked to jury size. The absence of
such a finding, however, was likely attributable to a "confound"
213
masking such a difference. The study involved 128 juries composed
216 See Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 163, at 281 (asserting that the validity of
empirical studies differs, and the intelligent use of empirical evidence requires a
critical evaluation of the research).
207 See Saks, supra note 1, at 19 ("The importance of method cannot be
overstressed.").
20 See id. ("Studies using poor methods tell one nothing; but they can seriously
mislead because their findings still may properly be called 'empirical.'").
2 None of the four empirical studies cited by the Colgrove Court was published in
a psychology journal, where peer-review by a board of psychological researchers is an
inherent part of the article-selection process.
2'0 The four studies were: INSTITUTE OFJUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, A COMPARISON
OF SIX- AND TWELVE-MEMBER CIVIL JURIES IN NEW JERSEY SUPERIOR AND COUNTY
COURTS (1972) [hereinafter IJA], cited in JOHN MONAHAN AND LAURENS WALKER,
SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW 191 & n.13 (2d ed. 1990) (finding no significant differences in
tendency toward verdict outcome between six- and twelve-person juries in jurisdictions
where litigants were permitted to choose jury size); Gordon Bermant & Rob Coppock,
Outcomes of Six- and Twelve-Member Juty Trials: An Analysis of 128 Civil Cases in the State
of Washington, 48 WASH. L. REV. 593, 596 (1973) (finding that "six- and twelve-member
juries behaved identically in the cases under consideration"); Kessler, supra note 163,
at 712 (finding no significant difference in verdicts of six- and twelve-person mock
juries evaluating a videotaped trial); and Mills, supra note 163, at 710-11 (finding no
discernible differences in jury decisions when comparing groups of twelve-member
jury decisions and six-memberjury decisions).
21, Saks, supra note 1 at 19.
212 See Bermant & Coppock, supra note 210, at 596.
213 A confound, typically the result of methodological flaws in the experimental
design, occurs when several potential causes for a given result are allowed to vary
together. Consequently, it is impossible to discover which of the potential causes is
responsible for a discerned change in result. See id. (explaining how a confound
creates weaknesses in a study).
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of either six or twelve members. Those juries, however, also heard
128 different cases, with 128 different sets of facts, some or all of
which might have been severely skewed toward either the plaintiff or
the defendant. The cases also all involved different parties, different
judges, and different requests for damages. Finally, the attorneys in
each of the cases were allowed to pre-select their jury size prior to the
commencement of trial proceedings. Given that lawyers prefer
larger juries in complex cases, or when higher damages are sought,2 5
this feature alone could have masked a potential difference in the way
juries ruled. When combined with different facts, damage amounts,
judges, and parties, one cannot tell which factor was responsible for
216the experimental finding. As Saks pointed out, a careful reading of
the Bermant and Coppock study shows that:
When the researchers saw a difference they didn't like, they explained it
away by pointing to the confound. When they saw a non-difference they
did like, they made believe the confound wasn't there. Given the proce-
dures by which the data were collected and analyzed, one is simply un-
able to know what effect, if any, jury size did have.
217
Flaws aside, the study also was merely correlational-measuring
only the frequency of guilty and not-guilty verdicts across six- and
twelve-person juries in 128 separate trials, each with different parties
and different evidentiary facts.218 Results of such a correlational study
are of limited utility because any number of "artifacts" 219 hiding in the
facts or procedures of the individual trials might produce the result,
and "alternate interpretations.., undermine [any] conclusion that
jury size does not causally influence jury performance."20 This early
study is now largely archival, as its widely recognized methodological
flaws and correlational structure have rendered its conclusions
unauthoritaive.ul
211 See Bermant & Coppock, supra note 210, at 595-96 (establishing the governing
aspects of the study); see also REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THEJURY 33 (1983) (iterating
the problematic aspects of the Bermant & Coppock study); Saks, supra note 1, at 19
(noting that the ability of attorneys to pre-select their jury size may have had a
distorting effect on the study).
21S SeeHAsTrIEETAL., supra note 214, at 33.
216 See Saks, supra note 1, at 20.
217 Id.
218 See Bermant & Coppock, supra note 210, at 594-95.
219 An "artifact" is an artificial result produced by flawed experimental
methodology or the confluence of uncontrolled factors.
22 HASTIE ETAL., supra note 214, at 33.
22' See id. at 32.
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The Institute of Judicial Administration ("IJA") study, although
somewhat broader in scope,2 suffered from similar methodological
problems.2 Although the IJA study reported that twelve-member
juries required about twice as much trial time, deliberated longer,
and awarded triple the damages that average six-person juries
awarded, the researchers attributed these differences to the lawyers'
case selections. 4 Once again, the bias introduced by the lawyers'
systematic pretrial selection of six- or twelve-person juries to
correspond with cases of differing complexity and damage requests
operated as a confound. As a result, no definitive conclusions can be
drawn.2
Attorney case-selection bias was eliminated in the Michigan study
by timing the experiment to occur during the six-month period just
prior to and immediately following the Michigan legislature's
institution of compulsory six-member juries in all civil trials.2
Unfortunately, the legislature simultaneously created a mediation
board to encourage pretrial settlements in these cases. As a result,
lawyers still may have self-selected the more complex or expensive
cases for a hearing before this board, rather than trusting such cases
to an arguably less favorable27 six-person jury.2s Since there is no
data to show that such pre-selection did not occur, it is possible that
the six-member juries heard only the simpler cases, creating a
confound in the study. The study's conclusion that there is no
difference in verdict outcome between six and twelve-person juries is
therefore unreliable. While the study offered no proof that there was
a difference in verdict outcome attributable to jury size, the change in
the types of cases heard by six-member juries, via the siphoning off of
certain cases by mediation-board settlement, might have masked such
a difference.m
The IJA study, in addition to charting verdict distributions between six- and
twelve-person juries, also considered the effects of case type and damage amounts
requested and received. SeeIJA, supra note 210, at 191 & n.13.
SeeHASTIE ETAL, supra note 214, at 33 (critiquing the study); Saks, supra note 1,
at 19 (same).
22 SeeIJA, supra note 211, at 191 & n.13.
See HASTIE ET AL., supra note 214, at 33 (dismissing the results of the IJA study);
SAKS, supra note 191, at 191 (same).
2 SeeHASTIEETAL., supra note 214, at 33.
In the IJA study, lawyers favored large juries for more complicated trials or cases
with larger damage requests. SeeIJA, supra note 211, at 191 & n.13.
See Saks, supra note 1, at 19 (noting that lawyers well may have used the
mediation board in these cases to keep them away from a smallerjury).
22 See id.
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The presence of such confounds subsequently has caused most
social scientists to dismiss the results of the prior three studies.s' As
Saks noted, confound avoidance requires a properly designed
"controlled study," where the experimental methodology allows for
systematic, individual changes in the variables of interest.23
The Joan Kessler study offered the most progressive experimental
opportunity for a reliable finding ofjury-size differences at the time it
was conducted.s In this experiment, an identical videotaped case
was presented to a pool ofjurors randomly assigned to six- or twelve-
person panels. All other variables were controlled to assure that the
only difference between the assembled panels was their size.23
Unfortunately, two careless but critical problems doomed the
otherwise sound Kessler experiment.
First, the videotaped trial was so one-sided that none of the
assembled juries disagreed on the proper verdict. Without variability
in verdict outcome overall, verdict outcome could not possibly have
differed between six- and twelve-member panels. 4 Second, and
independent of the verdict-variability problem, the study's sample size
was too small to produce any reliable findings.2s3 As Saks observed,
"[a]ll competent social scientists know that the ability of a study to
detect effects is determined in part by the sample size. A good way to
guarantee that a study will find 'no differences' is to use a very small
sample size.,,236 Thus, although otherwise well-designed, the Kessler
20 See HASTIE ET AL., supra note 214, at 32 (stating that "methodological flaws make
any conclusions from these studies tentative at best"); see also SAKS, supra note 191, at
38 (asserting that the four studies suffer from a variety of classical flaws in research
design); Grofman, supra note 163, at 288 (agreeing with the conclusions of Zeisel &
Diamond); Lempert, supra note 163, at 646 (same); Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 163,
at 283 (dismissing the conclusions of the four empirical studies cited in Colgrove as
unauthoritative).
23' See Saks, supra note 1, at 19 (discussing the construction of "true experiments").
232 See id. (noting the increased reliability of "true experiments" which can avoid
confounds more readily).
2' See Kessler, supra note 163, at 719-22 (discussing experimental methodology).
See id. It is a fundamental principle of social-science research that if there is no
variability in the dependent variable (here, verdict outcome), it is impossible to see
how variations in independent variables (such as jury size) affect the dependent
variable, and thus, an experiment is rendered essentially worthless. As a result, most
experimenters conduct pilot studies to test their experimental stimuli in order to
avoid such problems.
Only eight twelve-member juries and eight six-member juries were assembled.
See Kessler, supra note 163, at 719 (discussing experimental methodology).
2 Saks, supra note 1, at 19 (noting that a sample size of 16 juries could reliably
detect differences in proportion ofjury verdicts between groups only if that difference
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study's two central flaws were, as Saks concluded, "adequate to insure
that the only finding that could have come from this study was no
difference between the different-sizedjuries."23'
Research and jurisprudence concerning jury size is riddled with
irony. The four empirical studies cited in Colgrove all criticized the
Williams Court for departing from the twelve-person jury standard
without the support of empirical evidence. Presumably, each of these
studies was conducted to provide just such evidence. Due to
their rampant methodological errors, however, these studies
"contribute[d] nothing"2 to the debate. The even greater irony,
however, is that the Court, on guard after the critical drubbing it took
in the wake of Williams, needed empirical evidence to support the
Williams holding, and embraced these flawed studies in Colgrove as
"convincing empirical evidence. "29  Although the experimental
researchers were partially responsible for these errors, the expertise
required to detect logical flaws in experimental research is modest,
and was certainly not beyond the ability of the Justices of the Supreme
Court.240 Summing up the state of affairs after Colgrove, Saks
concluded, "the Court and the respective advocates have consistently
failed to exercise the modest expertise that could have prevented this
remarkable incompetence. ,24' As a result, "[t]he Court currently
believes the matter of equality of performance for different-sized
juries is now well-established, when in truth there is still no evidence to
support such a conclusion.
2 42
C. The Functional Superiority of the Twelve-Person Jury
As previously noted, principled social-science experiments often
require three to five years from inception through publication.2
was 25% or higher). Since it is clear that a 25% difference in verdict outcome is much
higher than most scientists would consider a significant floor-differential to be, the
Kessler study was of limited utility from the outset.
2 Id. (citing the findings of the Kessler study).
2mId
29 See CoIgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 159 n.15 (1973).
214 See Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 163, at 392 ("[T]he courts know how to
consider critically traditional types of evidence presented in adversary proceedings.");
see also Saks, supra note 1, at 19 (noting the Justices' ability to detect flaws in
experimental research).
241 Saks, supra note 1, at 19.
242 Id. (emphasis added).
242 See supra text accompanying note 203.
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Consequently, the vast majority of the "veritable industry"2 of studies
about jury size inspired by Williams was not published until the mid-
1970s, after Colgrove was decided. The consistent findings delivered
by these studies probing the differences in the "essential feature Is]"
of the jury as cited in Williams45 now clearly establish the functional
246superiority of the twelve-person jury. Having committed itself in
Williams to a functional test of jury performance dependent on a
"combination of measurable factors,"247 the Court should have had no
choice but to "evaluate the empirical responses of scholars and social
science investigators" to those factors.248
1. General Findings of Small-Group Research
Conclusions based on small-group research make important
contributions to scholars' theoretical understandings and initial
hypotheses about the functional differences between six- and twelve-
member groups. Some well-known research findings, which have
been sufficiently corroborated to provide reliable information about
the way individuals function in groups, can thus provide critical
insight into the functional characteristics of different-sized juries.249
For example, the now-classic conformity studies of Muzafer Sherif °
244 Roper, supra note 163, at 978.
215 See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100-01 (1970) (establishing differences in
the jury's reliability, representative makeup, deliberative processes, likelihood of
conviction, and minority ability to resist majority pressure as the essential concerns in
examining differences between twelve-person juries andjuries of smaller size).
246 See Grofman, supra note 163, at 300-01 (stating that, based on available data, "a
strong case for the superiority of twelve-member juries over six-member juries can be
made").
217 For discussion of the "measurable factors" the Court considered important, see
supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
2's Tanke & Tanke, supra note 43, at 1131.
241 See id, see also Lempert, supra note 163, at 666-67 (discussing the role that small-
group research can play in the jury size debate). Lempert notes that the methodology
of small-group research limits, to some degree, its overlay onto the jury size problem.
Much of the small-group research is based on the findings of experiments conducted
on students who face much different problems than those faced by juries.
Furthermore, much of the small-group research focuses on the differences between
groups of two and seven, rather than groups of six and 12. See id.
"0 See Muzafer Sherif, Group Influences upon the Formation of Norms and Attitudes, in
READINGS IN SocIAL PsYcHoLOGY 77, 90 (T. Newcomb & E. Hartley eds. 1947)
(illustrating that individuals' judgments tend toward conformity when placed in a
group context); see also A. PAUL HARE, HANDBOOK OF SMALL GROUP RESEARCH 20-21
(2d ed. 1976) (discussing the results of the famous nonmoving light experiment
where individuals were placed in a dark room, shown a pinpoint of light which did not
move, and asked how far the light moved. Individuals were then placed back in the
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and S.E. Asch2t provided the foundation for jury-specific studies of
minority conformity to majority pressure. These early experiments
conclusively demonstrated the remarkable degree to which individual
group members could be pressured to conform to the will of the
majority,22 the importance of an ally in increasing the likelihood that
a single dissenter will hold out against a majority, s5 and the fact that,
as group size increases, "there is an increase in the opportunities to
form subgroup coalitions representing minority opinions."2
Another early report summarized the results of thirty-one
separate studies on group size and concluded that when analyzing
group performance and group productivity, under no conditions
were smaller groups superior. The authors noted that the size of a
group should be taken into account in any theory of group
behavior.25 Richard Lempert suggested that the superiority of larger
dark in groups. When asked how far the nonmoving light had moved, prior individual
judgments gave way to a group norm).
2' See Asch, supra note 186 (describing the results of his now-famous line-length
experiment where the influence of an arranged, intentionally incorrect but
unanimous group opinion about the length of drawn lines on a card was enough to
dissuade an individual from responding one-third of the time with her correct present-
sense impressions); Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, 193 Sci. AM., Nov.
1955, at 31, 31-35. In this second experiment, Asch illustrated that if a naive subject
was given an ally who gave the true estimate of the line length, the naive subject's
conformity to group pressure was significantly reduced. Further, if the allyjoined with
the naive subject during the experiment, the subject acted independent of the
majority. See id. These findings have been widely corroborated and are now generally
accepted by social psychologists. See HARE, supra note 250, at 32-33 (cataloguing
studies which corroborate the Sherif/Asch findings); Lempert, supra note 163, at 674
n.94 (reiterating the acceptance of the Sherif/Asch study).
25 See HARE, supra note 250, at 20-21 (describing the nonmoving light
experiment's illustration of group influence on individual behavior); Asch, supra note
186, at 199 (stating that, in the line-length experiment, although a substantial
proportion of individuals retained their independence, a substantial proportion
modified their responses in accordance with the majority); Sherif I, supra note 250, at
78-86 (citing the nonmoving light experiment as an example of how societal norms
are defined by contact with others).
2s See HARE, supra note 250, at 32-33 (noting that experiments show that having
one person support the subject's position increases the likelihood of the subject
holding out against the majority); Asch, supra note 251, at 34 (stating that "[t]he
presence of a supporting partner depleted the majority of its power"); Lempert, supra
note 163, at 674 (noting that experiments show that support from an ally prevents the
subject from conforming even though the majority was very large).
2 HARE, supra note 250, at 33 (citing A. Paul Hare, A Study of Interaction and
Consensus in Different Sized Groups, 17 AM. SOC. REV. 261, 261-67 (1952)).
5 See Edwin J. Thomas & Clinton F. Fink, Effects of Group Size, 60 PSYCHOL BULL
371, 373 (1963) (reviewing the results of ten experimental studies which dealt with the
effects of group size on group performance in problem solving and finding a positive
correlation between group size and group performance).
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groups over smaller groups, in theory, derived from the "participation
of a greater number of individuals with more diverse viewpoints in
the problem-solving effort."2 Research has demonstrated that larger
groups perform better in situations where the quality of the group
solution is measured by the sum-total contribution of all members.257
Given that the Williams Court explicitly valued representative
community participation as one of the "essential features" of the
jury,m the Court should agree that a jury decision which allows the
contribution of a broader cross-section of the community is, in that
sense, of "higher quality."
Early research on group size also illustrated that in fact-intensive
or observational situations, larger groups outperformed smaller
groups because there were more individual members available to
provide critical contributions at different stages of the process.259
Thus, where memory is important, a larger group is more likely to
recall crucial facts vital to the proper solution of the problem.26' This
result can be extended to juries, since recall of facts and in-court
observations is crucial to the deliberative process.26' Consequently,
"larger juries are likely to be superior to smaller juries where memory
or a good understanding of facts and instructions is crucial to the
deliberative process.
2 6 2
Some areas of small-group research, however, seemingly suggest
potential advantages of smaller juries. For example, group research
has shown that larger groups are harder to coordinate and that
smaller groups are better able to resolve problems requiring a
consistent strategy or coordinated movements.26 The same body of
work, however, also demonstrates that some larger groups are better
2' Lempert, supra note 163, at 685.
27 See id. at 686.
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
29 See William L. Faust, Group Verus Individual Problem-Solving, 59 J. ABNORMAL &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 68, 77 (1959) (explaining that groups perform better in memory-based
experiments because individuals forget different elements, but working together, they
can complete the task).
260 See Harold H. Kelley & John W. Thibault, Group Problem Solving, in 4 HANDBOOK
OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 59, 65-66 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson eds., 2d ed.
1969) (stating that experiments show group-recall scores to be higher than the best
individual scores).
2 See Lempert, supra note 163, at 686-87 ("[A] large group is more likely to
contain members who recall crucial facts at each stage of the problem-solving
activity.").
22 id.
263 See id. at 691.
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at solving complex human-relations problems. Since jury delibera-
tions involve these complex problem-solving issues, and since the very
nature of deliberation often precludes coordination of the group as a• • 264
whole, this finding actually supports the use of twelve-personjuries.
Other studies suggest that smaller groups encourage equality of
participation.265 Lempert noted, however, that this difference is
largely artifactual. Assuming that a six-person jury and a twelve-
person jury deliberate for an equal number of hours, "the percentage
participation of members of a larger group will always be less than the
percentage participation of members of smaller groups, simply
because there are more members [in the larger group] to share the
time. "266 However, simply calculating percentage participation time
does not consider the quality of participation, or the more critical
question of whether an individual has succeeded in making all the
arguments she considered relevant.267 In the larger jury, probability
of argument or fact repetition increases with the larger number of
speakers. Thus, an individual's lower "percentage" of participation
may also reflect the fact that her arguments or factual points have
already been made. Hans Zeisel's and Shari Diamond's 26s work
further undercuts arguments suggesting that smaller juries encourage
more equal participation by showing that jurors holding the minority
opinion on twelve-person panels participate in a disproportionately
269large share of the deliberation.
Summarizing the entire body of small-group research as extended
to the jury, Lempert concluded that:
See id. (citing a study for its conclusion that, in solving complex human-relations
problems, groups of 12 and 13 were significantly better than groups of 6, 7, or 8). For
further discussion of this study, see DavidJ. Fox et al., Comparison of Decisions Written by
Large and Small Groups, 8 AM. PSYCHOL. 351 (1953).
2 See, e.g., L. Richard Hoffman, Group Problem Solving, in 2 ADvANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 99, 99-127 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1965)
(reviewing the literature on how groups use the resources of their members to solve
problems, as well as which factors inhibit and which factors promote effective problem
solving).
2'6 Lempert, supra note 163, at 693.
2 See id. at 694.
2 See Shari Seidman Diamond, A Jury Experiment Reanalyzed, U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
520, 525-27 (1974) ("[T]he average participation of minority members [of a jury]
exceeds the expected participation by a greater amount in twelve-member juries than
in six-memberjuries.").
29 See id, see also Lempert, supra note 163, at 694-95 (citing R. SIMON, THEJURYAND
THE DEFENSE OF INsANITY 244 n.9 (1967) ("[C]ases in which all twelve jurors did not
contribute at least one comment were unusual.")).
1998]
666 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW
the evidence is generally consistent and overwhelming. Current knowl-
edge justifies the general conclusion that where the verdicts of six- and
twelve-member juries diverge, the verdicts of twelve are likely to be of
somewhat higher quality than the verdicts of six, and are likely to be
superior with respect to other important values.
2 70
2. Community Representativeness and Impact of Minority Viewpoints
Although "obtaining a representative cross-section of the
community", 71 was, for the Williams Court, one of the central purposes
of the jury, the Court concluded, without a scintilla of evidence, that
"in practice the difference between the twelve-man and the six-man
jury in terms of the cross-section of the community represented seems
likely to be negligible."27 2 Subsequent research has proven the
273Court's speculation in this area to be erroneous.
In an experiment comparing six- and twelve-person juries
selected from the same population pool, Lempert illustrated that
jurors on the larger panels more accurately represented the
community from which the groups were drawn, and that the
attitudinal characteristics of twelve-person juries more closely
represented the average attitudinal characteristics of the pool.
274
Between six and twelve-person juries, there was a substantial
difference in the representation of jurors with minority attitudinal
characteristics, racial identities, or perceptual viewpoints, as is
illustrated below.
27 Id. at 698 (emphasis omitted).
271 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
27 Id. at 102.
23 See Lempert, supra note 163, at 668-79 (charting the significant differences in
minority representation between six- and twelve-person juries); see also Dale W.
Broeder, The Negro in Cour, 1965 DUKE LJ. 19, 23 (suggesting that in one case, the
presence of one blackjuror on ajury prevented prejudicial voting effects).




Probabilities forJuries of Six and Twelve That No juror Will Be
Selected with a Characteristic Shared by Given Percentages of
Individuals in the Population from Which the jury Is Drawn
Percentage of individuals In six-member In twelve-member
sharing characteristics in juries juries
the population
55-100% 0.00 (0%) 0.00 (0%)
50% .016 (2%) 0.00 (0%)
45% .028 (3%) .001 (0%)
40% .047 (5%) .002 (0%)
35% .075 (8%) .006 (1%)
30% .118 (12%) .014 (1%)
25% .178 (18%) .032 (3%)
20% .262 (26%) .069 (7%)
15% .377 (38%) .142 (14%)
10% .531 (53%) .282 (28%)
5% .735 (74%) .540 (54%)
0% 1.00 (100%) 1.00 (100%)
Thus, in a hypothetical jurisdiction where African-Americans
constitute ten percent of the jury pool, more than half of six-person
juries would fail to include an African-American member, compared
to just over one quarter of twelve-person juries. Given that the
presence of a single African-American on a jury could be significant
both in inhibiting other jurors from expressing prejudicial opinions
276which could influence the deliberative process and in providing
expertise regarding the "black experience" or certain cultural or
27 Id. at 669 (parenthetical percentages added). These results exactly corroborate
Zeisel's earlier (but more abbreviated) statistical findings. See Zeisel, supra note 163, at
716, 720 (finding that, assuming a 10% minority population, 72% of twelve-member
juries would have one minority member compared to 47% of six-member panels, and
that the expectation of seating two minority members is 34% on a twelve-person jury
compared to 11% on a six-personjury).
2 See Lempert, supra note 163, at 670; see also Broeder, supra note 273, at 23
(noting that evidence from post-trial juror interviews revealed that the presence of a
blackjuror inhibited at least two otherjurors from siding with a prejudicial faction).
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linguistic conventions unique to the African-American community,
27
this finding is not "negligible" as the Williams Court suggested.
Although, theoretically, larger juries are more likely to include
jurors with outlying antisocial viewpoints, most such viewpoints7 s are
sufficiently uncommon that they will very rarely infiltrate even larger
juries. Potentialjurors harboring such antisocial viewpoints might be
challenged for cause during voir dire. Or, if seated on a jury, they
might suppress entirely such viewpoints, given the normative
unpopularity of such positions. 9 Given the statistical rarity of such
viewpoints in most jury pools, a "radical juror" would almost certainly
stand alone, and would thus face the same pressures to conform
discussed earlier.s °
The conformity effects seen in the Sherif and Asch experiments
can also be expected to appear in the jury context.2s' Given what is
known about the influence of group-conformity pressure, the
presence of a minority juror or minority viewpoint on a jury, though
27 See Lempert, supra note 163, at 670 (noting that a "black juror [may] possess[]
expertise that allows him to give other jurors important information"). Lempert
suggested, for example, that a black juror might be uniquely qualified to explain,
based on her life experience, why an innocent inner-city African-American youth
might run from the police. See id.
278 "Outlying antisocial viewpoints" might include such things as bigotry, anti-
Semitism, anarchism, and the like. See id. at 672-73.
29 See id.; see also Baum, supra note 2, at 12-13 ("One of the virtues of the jury
system is the canceling out of an individual juror's prejudices by offsetting
predilections of otherjurors .... Because the chances of... heterogeneity are greater
with the twelve-man jury, the bias-canceling process works more effectively with the
larger jury.").
210 See HARE, supra note 250, at 20 ("[The] process of modification of behavior may
range from an individual's conscious attempts to conform to norms to the
unconscious acceptance of group or individual directives."); Asch, supra note 186, at
189 (discussing "social and personal conditions that induce individuals to resort to or
yield to group pressures"); Asch, supra note 251, at 31 (discussing the urge toward
social conformity); Sherif, supra note 250, at 90 ("The introspections reveal that the
subjects become conscious of the norm which develops in the course of the
experiment.").
281 See, e.g., Roper, supra note 163, at 986. Asch's research was an extension of
Sherif's work. Although jury deliberations involve more ambiguous and more
challenging problems than those posed by Sherif and Asch, the social-psychology
literature suggests that such difficulty and ambiguity should only exacerbate the
observed conformity effects. Lempert noted:
When a problem is clear, individuals probably feel that there is little to gain
from knowing how others would resolve it.... When evidence is ambiguous,
individuals may be more willing to rely on the judgments of those who appear
to find the evidence not ambiguous than would ordinarily be the case.
Lempert, supra note 163, at 675 n.96.
[Vol. 146: 621
STATE CRIMTNALJURZES
significantly more likely on a twelve-person jury than on a six-person
jury, will be most influential only if that minority position is joined by
an ally.2 2 As such, inquiries into the probability of "double-minority
representation" on six- and twelve-person juries in a given population




Probability That At Least a Certain Number of Jurors
with a Particular Characteristic Will Be Chosen When
That Characteristic Is Shared by Given Percentages of
the Population from Which Jurors Are Drawn
Percentage of Probability of drawing Probability of drawing
individuals sharing 2 or more out of 6 2 or more out of 12
characteristics in the
population
85-100% 1.00 (100%) 1.00 (100%)
80% .998 (100%) 1.00 (100%)
75% .995 (100%) 1.00 (100%)
70% .989 (99%) 1.00 (100%)
65% .978 (98%) 1.00 (100%)
60% .959 (96%) 1.00 (100%)
55% .931 (93%) 1.00 (100%)
50% .891 (89%) .997 (100%)
45% .836 (84%) .992 (99%)
40% .767 (77%) .980 (98%)
35% .681 (68%) .953 (95%)
30% .580 (58%) .915 (92%)
25% .466 (47%) .842 (84%)
20% .345 (35%) .725 (73%)
15% .224 (22%) .557 (56%)
10% .114 (11%) .341 (34%)
5% .033 (4%) .118 (12%)
0% 0.00 (0%) 0.00 (0%)
212 See, e.g., Asch, supra note 251, at 34.
Lempert, supra note 163, at 677 (parenthetical percentages added).
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As Table 2 illustrates, assuming the same ten-percent African-
American population in a given jury pool, a twelve-person jury
jurisdiction would seat a "viable minority"214 in more than one-third of
all trials, whereas a six-person jury jurisdiction would seat a viable
minority only about one time in ten. Lempert's findings, resulting
285from a principled statistical analysis, pose a direct challenge to the
Williams Court's wholly unsupported claim that "in practice the
difference between the twelve-man and the six-man jury in terms of
the cross-section of the community represented [is] likely to be
negligible. 2816
3. Jury Size, Representation, and Outcome-Determinativeness
The presence of a viable minority dyad has been experimentally
shown to be sufficient to resist even a large opposing majority.217 If
Asch's conformity theory holds, twelve-person juries should deliberate
more vigorously, and hang "substantially more often" than six-person
juries because of the increased frequency of viable minority positions
on twelve-person juries.288 Harry Kalven, Jr. and Hans Zeisel had
earlier realized this result in a purely comparative evaluation of a
large sample of six- and twelve-person jury verdicts, finding that only
2.4% of the six-person juries hung, compared to 5.5% of the twelve-
S • 289
personjuries.
284 See Roper, supra note 163, at 987 (defining "viable minority" as a minority
position supported by at least two jurors, and thus, capable of withstanding majority
conformity pressure).
M Lempert's extended analysis corroborated Zeisel's earlier statistical analysis. See
Zeisel I, supra note 163, at 716, 720.
288 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 102 (1970).
27 See Asch, supra note 251, at 34 (reporting that a minority comprised of more
than one was more difficult to sway in an experiment); Lempert, supra note 163, at 678
(noting that a person with a minority position is more likely to withstand the group
pressure of the majority if at least one other person shares the minority position); cf.
Zeisel I, supra note 163, at 719-20 (noting that hung juries almost always occur when
there are several original dissenters).
See Lempert, supra note 163, at 676 (asserting that twelve-person juries should
hang more frequently than six-person juries if Asch's work is accurate).
289 A statistical comparison was made between six-person jury verdicts culled from
the Miami Circuit Court (Florida's largest court), and twelve-person jury results
collected from a national sample. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 163, at 56-57
(stating that twelve-person juries hang in 5.5% of all cases); Zeisel I, supra note 163, at
720 (reporting the percentages as 2.4% and 5.0%, respectively). A discrepancy
between results reported in The American Jury and Zeisel's later article quoting the
book, Zeisel I, supra note 163, is apparently due to a misprint in the later article. See
Lempert, supra note 163, at 676 n.99 (noting the discrepancy between the 5.0% figure
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Although the validity of this finding was still largely in question at
the time of Lempert's study,2 subsequent research has sufficiently
corroborated the effect.29' Using a case developed to exhibit equated
sets of empirically weighted facts in the prosecution's and defense's
case, and sets of six- and twelve-person juries with no significant
292demographic differences, Angelo Valenti and Leslie Downing
adjusted the factual evidence presented to the various juries to create
two experimental conditions: one where six- and twelve-person juries
were presented with a case that slightly favored the prosecution, and
one where the different-sized juries were presented with a case that
slightly favored the defense.9 Statistical analysis revealed that in the
slightly pro-prosecution scenario, six-person juries convicted the
defendant significantly more often than twelve-person juries.
Although the standard in criminal cases requires that ajury be certain
"beyond a reasonable doubt," results showed that where the
empirically weighted facts were carefully designed to remain highly
ambiguous and thus not beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant
was convicted nine out of ten times by six-person juries, but only two
out of ten times by twelve-person juries."
Valenti and Downing concluded that twelve-person juries were
more sensitive to the "ambiguities in the case,"2 ' so that generally,
conviction-seeking jurors found it impossible to sway other factions to
convict the defendant on ambiguous evidence. Six-member juries,
in Zeisel's article and the 5.5% figure in Zeisel's earlier book and speculating that the
discrepancy might be due to a misprint).
Although purely comparative in nature, the discrepancy in the percentage of hung
juries between juries of different sizes recognized in Zeisel I is most likely accurate due
to the large sample size. See id. (stating that it is unlikely that the discrepancy is due to
a flaw in data collection or comparison).
See Lempert, supra note 163, at 676 (citing only the Kalven & Zeisel work in
support of this premise).
29' See SAKS, supra note 191, at 18 (asserting that smaller juries are less likely to
hang); Kerr & MacCoun, supra note 200, at 359 (reporting that six- and twelve-person
juries differed significantly in hungjury rates, with twelve-member juries hanging
more often); Roper, supra note 163, at 990 ("[T]welve-member juries hang
significantly more often than do smaller juries."); Valenti & Downing, supra note 163,
at 274 (corroborating the predicted effect that reducingjury size from 12 to six would
greatly increase conviction rates).
2'2 SeeVaenti & Downing, supra note 163, at 273 (describing the case as containing
25 facts favoring the prosecution and 25 favoring the defendant).
2' Instrument-reliability analysis revealed that the evidence had been successfully
manipulated between these two conditions such that each varied from neutral by the
same degree. See id. at 274 (confirming the validity of the manipulation).
See id. (providing a table which outlines the results of the experiment).
295 Id.
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however, almost always convicted when presented with the same
evidence, perhaps due to the increased group pressure in the smaller
panels. 0 Given that the "reasonable doubt" standard is a cornerstone
of criminal law, Valenti and Downing's findings regarding jury size
and conviction propensity are extremely significant.
In a subsequent study, Robert Roper suggested that a viable
minority, much more common in twelve-person juries than in six-
person juries, affected jury behavior in one of three ways: (1) by
refusing to conform to the majority position, thereby causing a hung
jury; (2) by converting the "majority" to the minority viewpoint
through additional deliberation caused by the minority's refusal to
conform; or (3) by eventually conceding to the majority viewpoint
after thorough deliberation. 7 Consequently, Roper proposed four
experimental hypotheses: (1) juries with viable minorities will hang
more often than juries lacking viable minorities; (2) juries with viable
minorities will show more inconsistency between their predelibera-
tion propensities and their final verdicts due to the "persuasion
effect" coupled with the viable minority's ability to withstand the
majority's conformity pressure; (3) twelve-person juries, which are
more likely to seat viable minorities, will hang more often than six-
person juries; and finally (4) since viable minorities are more likely to
be seated on twelve-person juries, the final verdicts of twelve-person
juries will show more variance from their predeliberation dispositions
than will six-person juries. 9
Roper corroborated well-established conformity findings2 and
confirmed that viable minorities were significantly "more likely to
cause juries to hang than [were] non-viable minorities."3 0 0 Roper also
showed, however, that intense viable minority resistance could
facilitate the breakdown of an initial majority consensus."' The more
vigorous deliberation process caused by the presence of the minority
dyads allowed for a more complete examination of the case, which
sometimes produced a shift in the majority opinion. Not surprisingly,
See id. (noting a six-person jury's heightened susceptibility to group pressure).
2 See Roper, supra note 163, at 987 (discussing the different possibilities that arise
when a viable minority forms).
2" See id. at 987-88.
See, e.g., Asch, supra note 251, at 34 (finding the presence of an ally to be the
critical factor in an individual's ability to resist conformity pressure from the group
majority).
Roper, supra note 163, at 988.




however, such verdict shifts only occurred in juries with viable
minorities.s°  Finally, Roper confirmed that "twelve-member juries
hang significantly more often than do smaller juries,"10s a fact which
he attributed directly to the ability of viable minorities to influence
the deliberative process and resist conformity pressure from the
majority.3
s
On the basis of these findings alone, twelve-person juries should
be required in criminal cases, since at a minimum, twelve-person
juries facilitate minority resistance to conformity pressure from the
majority, promote a more vigorous deliberation of the issues, and
30 5deter immediate decisions in all but the most clear-cut cases.
Larger juries recall more facts, and in the complex human-relations
problems routinely faced by juries, provide a more thorough analysis
of the relevant issues, viewed through a broader range of lenses.
Although these deliberative differences do not always sway the
majority decision, the research shows that the use of twelve-person
juries provides significantly greater assurances that the jury will
function in accordance with its fundamental purposes as established
by the Court in Duncan and Williams.
A hung jury in a criminal trial favors the defendant because she
remains unconvicted. ° Subsequently, charges may be dropped,0 7
there might be a renewed opportunity for plea-bargaining, and, at the
very least, the defense has been fully exposed to the prosecution's
case.ee Given that a hung jury in a criminal case indicates at least
some degree of reasonable doubt, however, these results hardly seem
inappropriate. As long as our system of criminal justice is predicated
?" See id. (noting that "[o]nlyjuries with viable minorities produced verdicts that
were inconsistent with the group's predisposition").
S Id. at 990.
"4 See id. (stating that the results were "primarily a function of the resistance ability
of viable minorities").
305 See id. at 992 (suggesting that larger juries "promote resistance to majority
persuasion," engage in "extended discussion," and produce a "greater number of
ideas").
See Kerr & MacCoun, supra note 200, at 360 ("A hung jury is a relatively
favorable outcome for the defendant."); Lempert, supra note 163, at 677 ("Hung juries
generally aid defendants.").
30 This result is common when the jury was leaning toward acquittal. See Lempert,
supra note 163, at 677.
s See Kerr & MacCoun, supra note 200, at 360 (noting that a hung jury "may lead
to renewed plea bargaining"); Lempert, supra note 163, at 677 (pointing out that the
defendant "has had discovery of the prosecution's case, and will often be in a better
position to plea bargain").
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on a theory of innocence until guilt is proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, such results must be accepted as the product of a properly
functioning criminal justice system. As the preceding research has
illustrated, however, by permitting criminal juries to be reduced in
size, the Williams Court has undermined the deliberative processes of
the criminal jury in a way that reduces the thoroughness of
deliberation and the possibility of hung juries, and quiets voices of
reasonable doubt, potentially leading to more unjust convictions.
These arguments will be taken up more completely in Part V of this
Comment.
4. Consistency and Reliability of Verdicts
Lempert's research suggested that the verdicts of twelve-member
juries, while "better" because of the greater inclusiveness and
potential effect of minority viewpoints, also demonstrated more
consistency across similar cases and often mirrored the prevailing
decisions of the community at large.3 9 Zeisel also illustrated this
consistency effect in the context of damage assessment in civil trials.310
In Zeisel's hypothetical civil-damages case tried before a jury
composed of an entire community, the only dispute involved the
appropriate level of damages. One-sixth of the community favored an
assessment of $1000, one-sixth favored $2000, and similarly up to
$6000.31 A precise community compromise in this case would yield a
damage assessment of $3500. Zeisel showed, however, that when six-
member juries decided this case, only fifty-one percent of the verdicts
arrived at the expected compromise between $3000 and $4000, while
sixteen percent of the verdicts fell into the "haywire"012 outlier regions
either higher than $4500 or lower than $2500. In contrast, when
twelve-member juries decided the case, sixty-eight percent of the
verdicts fell between $3000 and $4000, while only four percent of
verdicts landed in the outlier regions.313 Zeisel's experiment is yet
another illustration that the twelve-member jury more consistently
See Lempert, supra note 163, at 679 ("[T]he statistical analysis indicates that
twelve-member juries are more likely than six-member juries to contain individuals
who represent minority groups and viewpoints.").
3o See Zeisel I, supra note 163, at 716-18 (noting that "the six-member juries show a
considerably wider variation of 'verdicts' than the twelve-memberjuries").
311 See id. (describing the experiment); see also Lempert, supra note 163, at 680-81
(same).
312 Baum, supra note 2, at 12.
313 See Zeisel I, supra note 163, at 716-18 tbl.2.
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reflects the average viewpoint of the community.
Lempert has shown that the greater tendency of twelve-member
juries to reflect the average judgment of the communities from which
they are drawn suggests that verdicts of two different twelve-person
juries, in distinct but similar cases, are also likely to be more
consistent with each other than are the verdicts of two six-person
juries. 4 Since our legal system "values the similar treatment of
individuals in like circumstances,"M Lempert concluded that "if the
community's judgment is the standard, the quality of decisions
rendered by twelve is likely to be higher than the quality of those of
six regardless of which party has the better case."316
D. The Third Time Is Not a Charm: The Bungling
of Ballew v. Georgia
The Court again faced the jury-size question in Ballew v. Georgia,
317
this time with a significant body of empirically and methodologically
valid psychological research at its disposal. The Court was unanimous
in its holding that five-person criminal juries were unconstitutional,
but was sharply divided in its reasoning. Justice Blackmun's opinion
revisited the Williams decision, explaining that:
By 1970 little empirical research had evaluated jury performance ....
[T]he Court found no evidence that the reliability of jury verdicts
diminished with six-member panels. Nor did the Court anticipate
significant differences in result, including the frequency of "hung"
juries.... [C]oncem that the representative or cross-section character
of the jury would suffer with a decrease to six members seemed an
'unrealistic one." As a consequence, the six-person jury was held not to
violate the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
3 1 8
Justice Blackmun acknowledged, however, that since Williams, a
"quantity of scholarly work on jury size had been generated."319
310Referring to these post-Williams studies, Justice Blackmun noted
SI See Lempert, supra note 163, at 681 (suggesting that "damages awarded by two
different juries to two plaintiffs suffering similar injuries are likely to be closer in
amount if the juries each have twelve members than if they each have six").
315 Id.
316 Id. at 684.
-11 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 230 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
Id. at 231 (plurality opinion).
"2 See id. at 231-39 nn.10-32 (plurality opinion) (cataloging the studies the Court
examined in reaching its decision-studies which included much of the work of
Lempert, Zeisel, Saks, and Asch discussed supra Part IV.C.1-4).
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that:
We have considered them carefully because they provide the only basis,
besides judicial hunch, for a decision about whether smaller and smaller
juries will be able to fulfill the purpose and functions of the Sixth
Amendment. Without an examination about how juries and small
groups actually work, we would not understand the basis for the
[argument against the use of smallerjuries] .52
The plurality opinion provided a well-documented, updated review of
the psychology literature and drew five sufficiently corroborated
conclusions. 22
First, the plurality admitted that proper empirical data revealed
that smaller juries were less likely to foster effective group
deliberation and might lead to "incorrect application of the common
sense of the community to the facts." 3 3 The plurality recognized that
"[a]s juries decrease in size.., they are less likely to have members
who remember each of the important pieces of evidence or
argument,,324 and are "less likely.., to overcome the biases of [their]
members to obtain an accurate result.
"3 2
5
Second, the plurality observed that "the data now raise doubts
about the accuracy of the results achieved by smaller and smaller
panels."32 6  The plurality also suggested that smaller juries have a
greater propensity to convict.3
7
Third, the plurality found that "the data suggest that the verdicts
of jury deliberation in criminal cases will vary as juries become
32' Id. at 232 n.10 (plurality opinion).
'2 See Grofrnan, supra note 163, at 289 (noting that Blackmun's opinion was,
according to one scholar, the most extensive use of social science ever made by the
Court); Tanke & Tanke, supra note 43, at 1132 ("The lead opinion included a... well-
documented discussion of legal and social scientific literature..
32 Ballew, 435 U.S. at 232 (plurality opinion).
324 Id. at 233 (plurality opinion).
"2 Id (plurality opinion).
-21 Id. at 234 (plurality opinion).
32 See id. (plurality opinion) ("Statistical studies suggest that the risk of convicting
an innocent person ... rises as the size of the jury diminishes."). Blackmun cites the
findings of Stuart Nagel and Marian Neef, Deductive Modeling to Determine an Optimum
Juy Size and Fraction Required to Convict, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q 933, for this conclusion.
While this study's initial assumptions have been deemed questionable, later research
has corroborated findings of increased conviction propensity in smaller juries. See,
e.g., Roper, supra note 163, at 979 ("Blackmun's opinion was unusual in its synthesis of,
and reliance upon, social science studies ofjury size. It was, in fact, largely aca-ate .... f);
Valenti & Downing, supra note 163, at 274 (noting that six-person juries "are far more
efficient" in reaching convictions than twelve-person juries). For a complete
treatment of this issue, see supra notes 163-200 and accompanying text.
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smaller, and that the variance amounts to an imbalance to the
detriment of one side, the defense." 28 The plurality recognized that
as jury size decreases, the opportunity for viable minority dyads to be
seated on those juries also decreases, reducing the chance of a hung
jury, and resulting in more convictions.32
Fourth, the plurality recognized that decreases in jury size
"foretell[] problems not only forjury decisionmaking, but also for the
representation of minority groups in the community."3 ° Justice
Blackmun's opinion cited the Court's history of protecting minority
representation on juries and invoked the language of Smith v. Texasl
and Strauder v. West Virginia.3s  The plurality concluded that "the
opportunity for meaningful and appropriate representation does
decrease with the size of the panels."3
Fifth, the plurality recognized that prior research showing no
differences between six- and twelve-person juries was methodologi-
cally flawed, and that later research had shown that important
disparities exist between the twojuries.33 The plurality noted that
Nationwide... these small percentages will represent a large number of
cases. And it is with respect to those cases that the jury trial right has its
greatest value. When the case is close, and the guilt or innocence of the
defendant is not readily apparent, [we rely on] a properly functioning
jury system [to] insure evaluation by the sense of the community and
[to] insure accurate factfinding.33
5
On the basis of this language, and with the strength of so much
empirical evidence behind it, it seemed that the Ballew plurality was
'2 Ballew, 435 U.S. at 236 (plurality opinion) (discussing studies embracing group
theory conducted by Asch, supra note 163; Lempert, supra note 163; and Zeisel I, supra
note 163).
52 See id. (plurality opinion) ("As the numbers diminish below six, even fewer
panels would have one member with the minority viewpoint and still fewer would have
two. The chance for hungjuries would decline accordingly.").
3Id.
' 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) ("It is part of the established tradition in the use of
juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the
community.").
" 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880) (noting that exclusion of minority elements of the
community contravenes "[t]he very idea of ajury ... composed of the peers or equals
of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine.").
Ballew, 435 U.S. at 237 (plurality opinion).
See id. (plurality opinion) (noting that "several authors have identified in jury
research methodological problems tending to mask differences in the operation of
smaller and largerjuries").
Id. at 237-38 (plurality opinion).
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finally prepared to overrule its decision in Williams. Instead, the
Court made yet another interpretive error, and again failed to
mandate twelve-person juries.3s 6 Despite drawing the five proper
conclusions just described, the Court used the results of these studies
comparing six- and twelve-person jury function to proscribe five-person
juriesss7 The Ballew holding left untouched the six-person criminal
juries which were condemned by the very studies the Court relied
upon to reach its decision.3s Without explanation or any attempt at
justification, the Ballew plurality misapplied the conclusions of the
entire body of social-science research it had taken such pains to
interpret properly, and by doing so, failed for the third time to reach
the conclusions the research demanded. The decision prompted
frustrated researchers to conclude that "[t ] he quality of social science
scholarship displayed in [the Court's] decisions would not win a
passing grade in a high school psychology class,"339 and prompted
angry referral to the Court's reasoning as "perverse']" and making
"no pretense at logic."
Although the Ballew Court was unanimous in ruling that panels
smaller than six in nonpetty state criminal trials were unconstitu-
tional, there was little agreement on rationale.s4t Only Justice Stevens
joined Justice Blackmun in relying on the aforementioned social-
science findings. Three Justices-Powell, Burger, and Rehnquist-
The Court's first error occurred in Williams, where it relied on six nonempirical
studies to dismantle first the twelve-person jury requirement. See Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78, 101 & n.48 (1970) ("What few experiments have occurred... indicate
that there is no discernible difference between the results reached by the two different
sized juries.") The second mistake occurred in Colgrove where the Court relied on
four deeply flawed empirical studies to reaffirm Williams. See Colgrove v. Battin, 413
U.S. 149, 159 & n.15 (1973) ("[F]our very recent studies have provided convincing
empirical evidence of the correctness of the Williams conclusion.. ").
337 See Ballew, 435 U.S. at 239 (plurality opinion) ("[We] conclude that the purpose
and functioning of the jury in a criminal trial is seriously impaired, and to a
constitutional degree, by a reduction in size to below six members.").
See id. (plurality opinion) ("[W]e adhere to, and reaffirm our holding in
Williams v. Rorida . .. ."). This is a holding inconsistent with the plurality's reasoning
that "'[l]argerjuries (size twelve) are preferable to smallerjuries (six). They produce
longer deliberations, more communication, far better community representation, and,
possibly, greater verdict reliability.... [This] supports the conclusion that further
reduction injury size threatens Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment interests."Id. at 242
(plurality opinion) (quoting SAKS, supra note 191, at 107).
"' Saks, supra note 1, at 18.
340 Roper, supra note 163, at 979.
4 See id. (discussing the Court's unanimous holding in Ballew regarding juries of




actually ridiculed the definitive conclusions of social science as
untested "by the mechanism of the adversary process" 2 and escalated
the controversy between the Court and social-science scholars by
dismissing the entire field of research on jury size as "numerology."3
Neither of these facts, however, sufficiently explains how the body of
research the Court depended on in deciding Ballew became the basis
for upholding the constitutionality of six-person juries."
V. THE PRACTCAL QUESTION: SAVING TIME AND MONEY
Jury selection typically involves a two-step process-voir dire of an
entire jury pool and subsequent selection of individual jurors.
William Pabst noted that careful analysis had been conducted on
cases heard in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia comparing the time and the costs of trials heard by twelve-
person juries with those heard by six-person juries.3 Data revealed
"virtually no reduction in time spent to impanel ajury or to try a case
when the six-man jury is used."346 This finding casts considerable
doubt on scholars' speculations that a reduction in jury size would
"permit a substantial savings of time for the courts and court
personnel.", 47  Pabst found that, in practice, eight jurors were
generally selected for six-member panels, and fourteen were almost
always seated on twelve-member panels,3 48 but the number of
342 BalLew, 435 U.S. at 246 (Powell, J., concurring injudgment).
m Id. (Powell,J., concurring injudgment). "Numerology," of course, is the study
of the occult significance of numbers. See THE AMERIcAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1242 (3d ed. 1992).
'4 See Roper, supra note 163, at 979 ("No research was cited-none is available-
which distinguished between five- and six-memberjuries.").
'" See William R. Pabst, Jr., Statistical Studies of the Costs of Six-Man Versus Twelve-Man
Juries, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 326, 327 (1972) (outlining the methodology used in
conducting the study comparing six- and twelve-person juries).
311 Id. Pabst noted that outliers in the data involving juries of both sizes were
excluded from the analysis-a common practice used to avoid distortion of the
averages. See id. at n.7.
14 Andrew W. Bogue & Thomas G. Fritz, The Six-ManJury, 17 S.D. L. REV., 285, 288
(1972). Bogue and Fritz suggested that six-person juries would "obviously take less
time to notify, call, impanel, interrogate, and otherwise manage .... It would take less
time to poll six jurors and six jurors could examine exhibits in less time during trial."
Id.
34 Two alternates were selected in each to hear the case in the event that the
regular jurors needed to be replaced during trial. Alternates, however, do not take
part in the deliberations unless they are called upon to replace regular jurors. See
Pabst, supra note 345, at 328.
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challenges was virtually identical for six- and twelve-person juries.39
Although there was no savings in time, the savings in cost were
significant. Pabst calculated a 41.9% savings between trials using six-
and twelve-person juries.350 Andrew Bogue and Thomas Fritz, ardent
advocates of reducingjury size,ml estimated that, in 1972, maintaining
the right to trial by a twelve-person jury cost South Dakota taxpayers
thirty-five cents each per year. They further estimated that juries of
six would cut the cost in half.
52
Lempert suggested, however, that any attempt to balance the
fiscal efficiency gained by the use of six-person juries against the
functional costs of using the smaller juries was an imperfect and
reckless practice.m3 Lempert questioned whether the Sixth Amend-
ment even allowed such a tradeoff of a defendant's rights, concluding
that "the savings of the smaller jury are quite likely outweighed by the
costs, some of which we may never measure. " m
CONCLUSION
The time is right to revisit the Court's decisions in Williams and its
progeny. The suburban creep of crime and the daily reports of
violence on the nightly news have put much of the country in a
prosecutorial mood. The recent, highly publicized trials of Rodney
King and O.J. Simpson have returned issues of minority
representation on juries and the proper function of the deliberative
process to the forefront of the nation's collective consciousness.
The Court in Williams defined the jury's essential goals: "to
promote group deliberation, free from attempts at intimidation, and
to provide a fair possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section
"9 See id. ("Surprisingly, the number of challenges is almost as large for the six-
man as for the twelve-man jury.").
350 Pabst's formula multiplied the average panel size (generally 8 or 14) by voir
dire time plus jury size multiplied by overall trial time to generate the overall time
expended. Average six-person juries expended 77.3 hours of effort per trial, while
average twelve-person juries expended 133.1 hours. See id.
" See Bogue & Fritz, supra note 347, at 290 ("We... have a duty to seek new and
better methods ofjudicial administration. The adoption of six-man juries.., is one
way of increasing court efficiency and at a substantial financial savings to both state
and federal governments....").
35 See id
m' See Lempert, supra note 163, at 699 (noting that "the final judgment on six
versus twelve will turn on the values that individuals subjectively place on minority




of the community." 5 The Court's primary considerations in contem-
plating departure from the twelve-person standard were: the reliabil-
ity and representative makeup of the smaller jury; the effectiveness of
the deliberative processes; the minority's ability to resist majority
pressure; and the likelihood that a smaller jury would favor one side
over the other s5
The Court displayed a surprising degree of unfamiliarity with the
nature of social-science research, first by relying on six nonempirical
studies in Williams, and then by relying on four flawed studies in
Colgrove, Although little properly conducted research was available at
the time these cases were decided, this does not excuse the Court's
reliance on this research to support its conclusions. As Saks noted,
very modest expertise would have been required to discredit the
studies the Court relied on in Williams and Colgrove. 7 This suggests
that some other motivation might explain the "remarkable incompe-
tence" -3 of these decisions.
The Court's decision three years earlier in Duncan reveals just
such a motive. The Duncan Court, in holding that the Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury applied to the states via
incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment, ruled that:
The test for determining whether a right extended by the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments with respect to federal criminal proceedings is also
protected against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment has been
phrased in a variety of ways.... [including] whether a right is among
those "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base
of all our civil and political institutions .... " Because we believe that
trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of
justice, we hold that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of
jury trial in all [state] criminal cases which-were they to be tried in a
federal court-would come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee.359
In a series of decisions preceding the incorporation of the Sixth
Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment in Duncan, the Court
announced that the jury contemplated by the Sixth Amendment was a
jury "constituted, as it was at common law, of twelve persons, neither
more nor less."'60 Three years after Duncan, Williams presented what
3S Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
5 See id. at 100-02 & nn.47-49.
3 SeeSaks, supra note 1, at 19.
= Id.
3'9 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968) (citation omitted).
Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349 (1898), overuled on other grounds by Collins
v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990).
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many thought would be an easy question with an obvious result-
namely, that the Court would require the states to use twelve-person
juries. The Court, however, faced a dilemma. If it stood by its earlier
decisions and incorporated the twelve-person jury into the
Fourteenth Amendment, it would have been treading near the
frontier of its constitutionally granted powers-in effect requiring
state legislatures to fund twelve-person juries for all nonpetty state
criminal cases.3 6' If the Court deferred to federalism concerns,
however, it would be forced to write a decision blatantly inconsistent
with its own precedent, uprooting almost eight hundred years of
common-law tradition.
It is interesting to question what might have happened had
Williams come before the Court prior to the Court's ruling in Duncan.
In the words of Justice Harlan's concurrence, the Court "strangely
[did] an about-face .... that before.., would have been unthink-
able."'62 The Williams Court's otherwise inexplicable disregard of
stare decisis and historical precedent for the twelve-person jury and
blatant misuse of "social science" evidence must have been prompted
by a desire to avoid fettering the states as required by Duncan.
The benefit of a quarter-century of additional research and the
clarity of hindsight enables us to conclude that Williams, Colgrove, and
Ballew were wrongly decided. As the Ballew Court admitted s3 we now
know that six- and twelve-person juries are not functionally
equivalent, as the Williams Court assumed.6 We know that recall of
facts, testimony, and in-court observations are compromised
significantly when a six-person jury is used in place of a twelve-person
jury. We know that the rate of hung juries declines and the rate of
conviction rises when smaller juries are used. We know that minority
representation, community representativeness, and quality of
deliberation all decrease when six-person juries are used. Finally, we
know that six-person juries are less reliable than twelve-person juries,
36 See Williams, 399 U.S. at 130 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment) ("'[I]f the
Court is prepared to relax [federal] standards in order to avoid unduly fettering the
States, this would be in derogation of... standards in the federal system.'") (alteration
in original) (quoting Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 45-46 (1963) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
62 Id. at 122 (Harlan,J., concurring injudgment).
See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232-37 (1978) (plurality opinion) (stating
the empirically demonstrated differences between six- and twelve-person juries).
See Williams, 399 U.S. at 102 ("[Iln practice the difference between the 12-man
and the six-man jury in terms of the cross-section of the community presented seems
likely to be negligible.").
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because they are less consistent in rulings on similar cases and
because they decide all cases at greater variance from larger
community preferences.
These findings have been sufficiently replicated and now
represent the views of a majority of social-science scholars. Both the
patent concerns about social science as "numerology" in Ballew, s and
the latent concerns about incorporation and federalism have lost
their vigor. The Court has relied on social science much more
actively since the time when these cases were decided, while the
battle over incorporation of the Bill of Rights has long since been
367won.
Williams and its progeny also gave rise to practical problems
plaguing the criminaljustice system, chief among them being the use
of jury size as a bargaining chip in plea-bargaining negotiations.
Given the ability to depart from the twelve-person jury "requirement"
with the consent of the defendant now provided by many state
statutes,m prosecutors who know the functional differences of these
juries have bargained in exchange for the defendant's waiver of his
369right to a twelve-person jury. It is unlikely that either the Framers
or the Court intended a criminal defendant's right to "trial by jury" to
become an element of currency in prosecutorial bargaining.
Further, in a series of decisions culminating in Batson v.
Kentucky,70 the Court attempted to maintain racial equality in the
courtroom. Research has demonstrated, however, that by allowing
smaller juries to be impaneled, the Court has opened a loophole
which might allow racially motivated prosecutors to circumvent this
line of jurisprudence and reduce or even completely eliminate
See Balew, 435 U.S. at 246 (Powell,J., concurring in judgment).
See, e.g., LAWRENCE S. WRIGtSMAN, PSYCHOLOGYAND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 26, 47
(4th ed. 1998) (summarizing the increased role of psychology in the law).
s7 The Court should no longer be concerned about financially burdening state
legislatures in violation of the federalism doctrine. Other Court decisions involving
Bill of Rights provisions reveal that placing additional financial burdens on state
legislatures is not a concern when imposing important individual-rights guarantees on
the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. Furthermore, regardless of the financial
savings achieved by a reduction in jury size, it is difficult, if not impossible, to put a
price on the liberty that provides the counterweight in this interest-balancing.
w See supra notes 148, 150.
369 See State v. Griffith, 561 So. 2d 528, 529 (Fla. 1990) ("[IThe state waived the
death penalty in exchange for an agreement with Griffith's counsel that Griffith would
waive a twelve-person jury and be tried instead before a six-person jury."). For further
discussion of this problem, see supra note 149 and accompanying text.
370 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (disallowing racially based peremptory challenges).
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minorities or minority influence from their juries. This potential
result of Williams and its progeny stands in direct opposition to the
Court's policy stance taken in Batson.
Given that the body of social science comparing six- and twelve-
person juries directly implicates what the Williams Court labeled the
"essential feature (s] "3 of a jury, a state criminal defendant, facing a
six-person jury, might now be able to bring a legitimate Sixth
Amendment challenge that the jury she faces is not a "jury" as
contemplated by the Constitution.37 Such a claim now could succeed
on the grounds that the aforementioned problems with the use of six-
person juries effectively compromise a criminal defendant's
"fundamental [Sixth Amendment] right"374 to trial by jury, given the
Williams Court's statement of what such juries must provide.75
Given what is now known about the functional differences of six-
and twelve-person juries, particularly in the areas of community
representation, reliability and consistency of verdicts, conviction rates,
and deliberation quality, a criminal defendant's right to trial by a
twelve-person jury should be "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,"376 and "fundamental to the American scheme ofjustice."
77
The reversal of Willias and its progeny should not be barred by
stare decisis. The Court has noted that stare decisis is a "principle of
,71 See supra notes 274-86 and accompanying text (illustrating how a reduction in
jury size could reduce the influence of, or even completely eliminate, minorities from
jury panels).
372 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
'17 See; e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 431 A.2d 135, 136-37 (N.H. 1981) (noting that
the New Hampshire legislature has no power to depart from the twelve-person jury
standard because "'no body of less than twelve men, though they should be by law
denominated a jury, would be a jury within the meaning of the [New Hampshire]
constitution; nor would a trial by such body, though called a trial by jury, be such,
within the meaning of that instrument.., especially in light of the number of
empirical studies that have questioned the impact of the six-memberjury on our court
system.'") (quoting Opinion of theJustices, 41 N.H. 550, 552 (1860)).
374 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
'75 See Williams, 399 U.S. at 100.
371 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (defining "fundamental rights").
"' Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149. The Court has recently taken steps to ensure the
community representativeness of criminal juries by proscribing race-based peremptory
challenges, see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986), and gender-based
peremptory challenges, seeJ.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994).
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policy,"7 8 not an "inexorable command,"9 and the Court has
overruled governing cases that were "badly reasoned. "38' The Court
has expressed a willingness to overrule its decisions, despite the
doctrine of stare decisis, when the passage of time brings its prior
mistakes to light. This principle is especially true when the earlier
misjudgments "contradicted an 'unbroken line of decisions,' [and]
contained 'less than accurate'... analysis. "381 In re-examining prior
holdings, the Court may ask "whether the facts have so changed or
[have] come to be seen differently as to have robbed the old rule of
significant application or justification.se There can be little doubt,
based on the additional information now available, that this is the
case with Williams, Colgrove, and Ballew.
Instructively, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Advisory
Committee did not amend their jury-size regulation after Williams.
Rule 23(b) continues to require that "Uluries shall be of twelve" for
all criminal cases heard in federal court, subject to waiver by the
defendant.ss Moreover, a subcommittee of the Judicial Conference is
considering an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
that would guarantee the right to a twelve-member jury in all civil
cases tried in federal court.s Since such an amendment would
ultimately have to be approved by the Supreme Court, the Court's re-
378 Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940); see also id. (explaining the
rationale for overruling its decisions despite the doctrine of stare decisis).
37 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991); see also id. (noting that especially
in constitutional cases, where Congress cannot easily remedy the Court's error, stare
decisis should not deter the Court from overruling prior cases).
" Id. at 827.
Sa United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 711 (1993) (quoting Solorio v. United
States, 483 U.S. 435, 439, 442 (1987)); see id. (overruling an earlier double jeopardy
case because of faulty historical analysis). Recall that the Court had stated directly that
the Sixth Amendment right to trial byjury contemplated ajury of 12 in a number of
decisions prior to Williams. Seesupra note 28 and accompanying text.
82 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992) (citation omitted); see
id. (noting that when considering whether to overrule an earlier precedent, the
Court's judgment is "informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations
designed to test the consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the
rule of law, and to gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior
case").
See FED. R. CRiM. P. 23(b) (stating that courts can proceed constitutionally with
less than 12jurors, instead of declaring a mistrial, only if "one of the jurors is seriously
incapacitated or otherwise found to be unable to continue" after the jury has
commenced deliberations and alternate jurors have been dismissed).
Id. Departure from the twelve-person jury requires a written waiver from both
parties and the approval of the judge.
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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examination of the entire line ofjury-size cases, starting with Williams,
386may lie just beyond the horizon.
With the evidence now available about the functional non-
equivalence of six- and twelve-person juries, it is clear that Williams,
Colgrove, and Ballew have no remaining logical foundation.8 7
Whether the next jury-size challenge comes by way of the Judicial
Conference, or in a Sixth Amendment challenge from a state
criminal defendant, there can be only one justifiable result: On its
next opportunity, the Supreme Court must bear the responsibility to
return all nonpetty state criminal juries to a consistent twelve-person
standard.
Although the Court could approve the amendment without implicating
Colgrov, if such an amendment is passed by the Judicial Conference, it no doubt will
be accompanied by a legislative history including many of the arguments made here.
It seems unlikely, if such an amendment is passed by a committee which includes
some of the best legal minds in the country, that the Court would fail to reexamine its
own position on the matter.
W While the limits of this Comment preclude a thorough examination of the
question of nonunanimous verdicts, much of the social-science analysis is clearly
applicable to that question as well. It is easy to see how even a nine-to-three split, as
allowed by Apodaca, see supra note 42, disempowers viable minority factions, greatly
limits jury deliberation, and eliminates all but the most divided of hungjuries. As a
result, Zeisel labeled the allowance of the nonunanimous verdict "[size] reduction
with a vengeance." Zeisel I, supra note 163, at 722.
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